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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction per Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. In viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to Allstate Insurance Co., did the trial court err in granting attorney fees 
and costs to Allstate Insurance Company? 
The standard of review for questions of facts is a clearly erroneous standard; the 
standard of review for "without merit" or a Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 
violation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229, 
1234 (Utah 1992), Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-204 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. In viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to Allstate Insurance Co., did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
plaintiffs second Motion for Summary Judgment when the law of the case was a factual 
dispute existed as to the reasonableness of expenses charged and the necessity of Mr. 
Pennington's treatment? 
The standard of review for denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether 
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions submitted in the case established a 
genuine issue of material fact. Ross v. Schackel 920 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1996); 
Snvder v. Merklev. 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). 
3. In viewing the totality of the facts and the trial court's advantaged position 
to observe the testimony of the witnesses first hand, are the trial court's findings of fact 
against the clear weight of the evidence such that this Court reaches a firm conviction a 
mistake has been made? 
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The standard of review of a trial court's findings of fact is whether the findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous and are against the clear weight of the evidence such that the 
appellate court reaches a firm conviction a mistake has been made. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 52(a); ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 
1997); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
4. On Cross Appeal, did the trial court err in reducing Allstate's attorney's fees 
when Pennington did not dispute the reasonableness inasmuch as his attorney charged 
more per hour and had more time invested in the lawsuit. 
The standard of review is a trial court discretion in an award of attorney fees must 
be based on an evaluation of the evidence. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 
991 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law in awarding attorney fees and costs is as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Attorney's fees—Award where action or 
defense in bad faith—Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the 
action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees-Reciprocal rights to 
recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
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Utah Code Ann § 78-33-10 Costs (regarding Declaratory Judgments) 
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make such award of 
costs as may seem equitable and just 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 Every pleading, motion, and other 
paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of 
Utah The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him 
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed 
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
For awarding costs, the determinative law is Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
54, which is set forth fully in Addendum A 
For awarding attorney fees and costs on appeal, the determinative law is Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 33, which is set forth fully in Addendum B 
The determinative law in reviewing the trial court's findings of fact is Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) which provides 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A, Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses 
The determinative statutes regarding Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits are 
Utah Code Ann §31A-22-307 0953 as amended) located in Addendum C, and Utah 
Code Ann S31A-22-309 0953 as amended) located in Addendum D 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint for his son-in-law 
Lorin Pennington against Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as 
"Allstate"), Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, D.C., Dr. Dale Bennett, D.C., Dr. 
Bryson Smith, Dr. Joan Balcombe, St. Benedict's Hospital and Associates in Radiology 
(R. 001-005). The complaint alleged Allstate had failed to pay the required $3,000 
Personal Injury Protection (hereinafter referred to as "PIP") benefits to Pennington or his 
medical providers (the other named defendants) arising from an automobile accident on 
June 18, 1993, as required by statute and contract. Pennington claimed the bills were past 
due and prayed for judgment against Allstate; or in the alternative, judgment against the 
defendant medical providers in the event the services rendered were determined by the 
court to be unreasonable and/or unnecessary (R. 001-005). 
Mr. Pennington, pursuant to his complaint, requested the trial court to determine 
the treatment he received and resulting expenses incurred after the accident were 
reasonable and necessary in relationship to the injury he received m the motor vehicle 
accident. If the court so determined (or if $1 not paid by Allstate was determined to be 
reasonable and necessary), Pennington demanded he be awarded attorney fees, costs and 
interest. In the alternative, he requested judgment against the medical providers claiming 
they provided him with unnecessary or unreasonable treatment and charges, and he had 
no obligation to pay their bills. 
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Under the insurance contract between Allstate and Pennington, Allstate had paid 
$1,694.59 of Mr. Pennington's medical expenses incurred after the accident. The amount 
in controversy was $1,305.41 (R. 006-007). 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
(1) Prior to filing suit. Prior to the automobile accident of June 18, 1993, 
Pennington entered into a contract of insurance with Allstate. Pursuant to the contract 
Allstate agreed to pay $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses caused 
by an accident covered under the policy. The contract was drafted in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307(l)(a)(1953 as amended) (R. 372-399, Exhibit D-33, 
Addendum E). Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services which are not 
usually and customarily performed for treatment of the injury, including fees for an 
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical services. Unreasonable medical 
expenses are fees for medical services which are substantially higher than the usual and 
customary charges for those services (R. 372-399, Exhibit D-33, p.ll; R. 1089, 
Addendum E). 
Under the insurance contract, Pennington must notify his company, Allstate, if he 
files a third party complaint. He may be required to take medical examinations by 
physicians Allstate chooses. He was to cooperate with Allstate in the investigation, 
settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit. If Pennington voluntarily took any action 
or mades any payments other than for covered expenses, Allstate would not be bound (R. 
372-399, R. Exhibit D-33, p.12-13, Addendum E). 
Mr. Pennington was injured in an automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in 
Ogden, Utah, suffering injury of an uncomplicated cervical strain (R. 1090; Vol. 2 T. 
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1439). He sought treatment the next day from his treating physician, Dr. Paul Taylor. Dr. 
Taylor's examination of Pennington revealed he had full range of motion. Dr. Taylor did 
not feel it necessary to take any x-rays or administer any further tests on that visit and told 
the plaintiff to follow a treatment plan of flexion exercises, ice, heat and rest and 
Ibuprofen. Mr. Pennington was told to report back if the problem was not resolved over 
the following weekend. Dr. Taylor mentioned the possibility of x-rays if the problem did 
not resolve but stated he ". . . doubted this will be necessary" (R. 1090; Exhibit P-l, 
Addendum F). 
The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Pennington returned to his primary care 
physician, Dr. Taylor, who prescribed more neck and shoulder exercises, ice and heat and 
a muscle relaxant, Flexeril (R. 1090; Exhibit P-l, Addendum F). 
Pennington never returns to his primary care physician, Dr. Taylor. On July 1, 
1993, Pennington goes to the Emergency Room at St. Benedict's Hospital and was 
examined by Dr. Joan Balcombe, an emergency physician. Pennington has full range of 
motion in his neck. Dr. Balcombe's diagnosis is likewise a cervical strain. Because of 
the Emergency Room setting, x-rays are ordered, which are normal. Dr. Balcombe 
ordered physical therapy for Pennington and told him to specifically call the next day to 
arrange for physical therapy (R.1093; Vol. 1 T. 1230-1237). 
Pennington did not call the next day to arrange for physical therapy. On July 6, 
1993, Pennington receives another examination, by Dr. Trimble at the Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic. Now, Mr. Pennington is diagnosed with "an acute traumatic 
acceleration/deceleration injury to the cervical spine resulting in myofascities with 
bilateral occupital neuralgia and grade II radiculopathy of the right upper extremity and an 
6 
acute traumatic lumbosacral sprain/strain resulting in myofascitis." Mr. Pennington seeks 
treatment from Burns Chiropractic seven times during the next eight days and receives 
manipulative treatment to his entire spine, hip and ribs. He receives x-rays from Burns 
Chiropractic—normal thoracic spine, two views with an interpretation; normal lumbar 
spine, four views with an interpretation (R. 1093-1094; Exhibit D-44). 
Attorney Dan Wilson, Pennington's father-in-law, then suggested he go to his, 
Attorney Wilson's, personal chiropractor and long-time acquaintance, Dr. Dale Bennett, 
at Bennett Chiropractic. On July 15, 1993, Mr. Pennington received a fifth physical 
examination from Bennett Chiropractic. His diagnosis is now "Acute, Moderate to 
Severe, Constant" (1) "Brachial Radicular Neuralgia," (2) "Cervical Hyperflex/Hyperext. 
Inj-*" (3) "Multiple Cervical Subluxation," (4) "Thoracic Subluxation Unspec," and (5) 
"Lumbar Subluxation Unspec." (R. Exhibit D-45). He goes to Bennett Chiropractic 20 
times during the next 30 calendar days receiving spinal manipulations and adjustments to 
treat problems to his thoracic spine, his hips, his ribs, his lumbar spine, and cervical spine 
(R. 1093; Exhibit P-6). 
On July 23, 1993, Pennington receives a manipulation from Dr. Bennett of the 
anterior ribs, the cervical 1, the sacroiliac 1, and the thoracic 6, 4, and 1. On July 24, 
1993, Pennington reports to Dr. Val Rollins, an emergency room physician, claiming he 
had been experiencing severe back pain for two days. Dr. Rollins finds no swelling or 
other objective symptoms, but because of plaintiff s self-reported persistent complaints of 
pain and the normal x-ray previously taken in the Emergency Room, he refers him to Dr. 
Bryson Smith for a neurological consultation (R. 1094, Vol. 1 T. 1249, Exhibits, P-5, 6). 
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Dr. Bryson Smith saw Pennington, and based on plaintiffs subjective complaints 
(Vol. 2 T. 1488) and treatment history, he ordered an MRI scan (R.1094). Dr. Smith's 
objective finding of Pennington was his cervical spine had full range of motion (Vol. 2 T. 
1513). 
The MRI scan was performed at St. Benedict's Hospital on about August 3, 1993, 
and was normal. Physical therapy was again recommended, and this time Pennington 
went to physical therapy six times along with massage therapy about three times (all of 
the massage therapy occurred on the same day as the physical therapy). During this 
period of time, Pennington also continued chiropractic treatment, some on the same day 
as the physical therapy. All treatment was completed by about August 26, 1993, and 
Pennington had achieved his goal of exceeding the $3,000 cap on medical expenses so he 
could pursue a claim against the other driver (R. 1094-1095). 
From June 18, 1993, until August 26, 1993, Pennington saw at least four different 
medical doctors, about five different chiropractors, involved an x-ray techinician and 
MRI technician and at least two medical doctors were apparently involved in the reading 
of those results, two physical therapists and a massage therapist, for a minimum of 12 
different medical providers (R. 1095). 
On July 30, 1993, Pennington came to the Ogden Allstate Claim Office. He met 
with Clay Hamblen on that day in the lobby. Mr. Pennington claimed to have a cervical 
strain and a back strain. Mr. Hamblen situated himself in such a way that Pennington had 
to move in full range of motion to talk with him. Mr. Hamblen observed he had no 
guarded movement. He observed him sit, stand, walk, and run to his car and bring 
something back in the office, without any difficulty (R. 1096, Vol. 3 T. 1688-1689). 
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Because Mr. Pennington had seen so many different providers and seem 
determined to see additional providers, and because he did not appear injured in any 
manner, Mr. Hamblen, with his manager, Hal Palmer, decided Mr. Pennington, under his 
insurance contract with Allstate, should undertake an independent medical examination 
(R. 1096, Vol. 3 T. 1691-1692, Vol. 4 T. 1882). 
Mr. Hamblen indicated to Pennington he needed to submit to an independent 
medical examination. Shortly thereafter, on August 13, 1993, Attorney Wilson called Mr. 
Hamblen. Attorney Wilson was very antagonistic in regard to an independent medical 
examination, and he refused to have his client submit to the independent medical 
examination. He informed Mr. Hamblem he had convinced Pennington to not see so 
many providers. Attorney Wilson engaged in other tactics which made it difficult to 
obtain an independent medical examination by Allstate until September 28, 1993 (R. 852, 
853,1096, Vol. 3 T. 1696-1698). 
When Dr. Nord examined Mr. Pennington on September 28, 1993, his spine was 
normal (Vol. 2, T. 1438). Dr. Nord determined Mr. Pennington had sustained an 
uncomplicated acute cervical strain as a result of the motor vehicle accident of June, 1993 
(Vol. 2, T. 1439). He involved too many players with this injury. He unnecessarily went 
from practitioner to practitioner which was not conducive to good care (Vol. 2, T. 1440). 
Other than continuation of a home exercise program already established and follow-ups 
as needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or 
medical follow-up was indicated (Vol. 2, T. 1441, Addendum G). 
Attorney Wilson filed this lawsuit against all defendants on January 21, 1994. 
Rather than structuring the lawsuit in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
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309(5)(d), Attorney Wilson sued Allstate and all health care providers which had not 
been paid. Pursuant to that lawsuit, Attorney Wilson sent letters, dismissal agreements, 
and acceptance of service to each one of the named defendants (but not his client's own 
insurance company, Allstate) (see example, Addendum H, letter, Addendum I, Dismissal 
Agreement and Acceptance of Service, R. 708-710). In these letters, Attorney Wilson 
informed the health care providers the lawsuit against them was a sham in that he was 
personally going against Allstate Insurance Company for the attorney's fees and costs 
and not against the medical providers. He stated he knew the dispute was, in reality, 
between the health care providers and Allstate. However, Attorney Wilson stated he was 
intending on pursuing this law suit against Allstate. Attorney Wilson stated: "However, 
my experience is that because of the cost, the health care providers never pursue the case 
and the insurance company gets away without paying the bills. This doesn't make me 
very happy so I don't plan to do that in this case. Instead I plan to press this matter 
to trial." (Addendum H, letter). 
The Agreement, drafted by Attorney Wilson, provided that if the court deemed the 
charges of the provider were reasonable and necessary, he would collect the money from 
Allstate and pay the money over to the health care providers (even though more money 
was owing to the health care providers than the remaining PIP benefits). In exchange, if 
the health care provider would sign the dismissal agreement and acceptance of service, 
and the court determined the charges were not reasonable or not necessary, the health care 
provider would not pursue Mr. Pennington (R. 1102-1103, Addendum I). 
Attorney Wilson did not inform the health care providers in the dismissal 
agreement sufficient funds were not left under the remaining policy PIP benefits to pay 
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each health care provider if the court determined the charges were reasonable and 
necessary (R. 1103, Addendum I). 
Attorney Wilson went further than sending the letters and dismissal agreements to 
the health care providers. He contacted specifically Dr. Bryson S. Smith and informed 
him that Allstate had determined his treatment was not medically necessary in regard to 
the injuries Mr. Pennington had sustained (although he did not inform him of all the 
various health care providers that had been seen by Pennington prior to Dr. Smith). 
Attorney Wilson asked Dr. Smith permission to do "whatever was necessary to obtain 
reimbursement from the insurance company for his client." Attorney Wilson "explained 
carefully to me that he did not believe that any of the medical care given by the various 
providers including myself, was in any way inappropriate. Nevertheless, he wanted to 
name me as a defendant in the suit claiming inappropriate care. He felt this maneuver 
might motivate the insurance company to pay the claim." Finally, Attorney Wilson 
"assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient had been inappropriate. He 
offered that, should this go to trial, he had a friend in town who would be willing to 
defend me at no charge." (R. Vol. 2 T. 1501, Exhibits D-16, D-17, Addendum J). 
On February 3, 1994, Attorney Wilson then wrote a letter to Hal Palmer indicating 
Allstate was required to pay the additional $1,305.41 or else he would bring suit for and 
on behalf of Lorin Pennington under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5)(d) (he already had 
filed the suit and served Allstate in Salt Lake). He threatened Mr. Palmer that if Allstate 
refused to pay this additional amount which Allstate had deemed was unreasonable and 
unnecessary, pursuant to the statute, if he recovered $1, he, being Attorney Dan Wilson, 
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would be entitled to full payment of attorney's fees and costs (R. 001, 018, 1101, Exhibit 
P-52,Vol.4T. 1938). 
(2) After suit was filed. Allstate initially filed a Motion to Dismiss or in 
the alternative a Motion to Appoint a Medical Panel on the basis plaintiffs claim for 
relief was not ripe for decision under contract law, tendered the remaining $1,305.41 
under the PIP statute and contract with Pennington to the court for decision as to whether 
any was owing, and requested the court to appoint a medical panel, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-22-307(2)(d) to determine the reasonableness and the necessity of the 
claimed charges and tender the remaining amount either to the providers or back to 
Allstate depending upon the medical panel's decision (R. 006-016). The Motion was 
denied, and Allstate filed an Answer (R. 024-025, 043-047). 
On February 19, 1994, Attorney Wilson filed a third-party complaint against Brad 
Beasley for the injuries Mr. Pennington allegedly received on June 18, 1993 (R. 1099). 
Attorney Wilson did not send a copy of the complaint to Allstate although his client was 
required to do so under his insurance contract with Allstate (R. 1089,1099). 
On March 17, 1994, Attorney Wilson had his client enter into a release with Brad 
Beasley and others releasing any and all claims, damages, actions, causes of actions or 
suits of any kind or nature whatsoever on account of injuries Pennington received in the 
automobile accident of June 18, 1993. A copy of the release and notice of the settlement 
was never sent to Allstate (R. 1100). 
In this suit, the defendant, St. Benedict's Hospital, filed an Answer and a 
Counterclaim against Pennington on June 11, 1994 (R. 058-073). Defense was tendered 
to Allstate, and Allstate settled the counterclaim against its insured, Pennington, and 
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Pennington's complaint and St. Benedict's counterclaim were dismissed with prejudice 
(R. 1118-1119). 
The defendant, Dr. Joan Balcombe, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis Dr. 
Balcombe was an employee of St. Benedict's and did not bill Pennington for any services 
(R. 091-93, 074-089). The trial court granted the Motion, and Dr. Balcombe was ordered 
dismissed with prejudice (R. 234-236). 
Defendant Associates in Radiology filed an Answer to complaint and 
Counterclaim against Pennington (R. 241-250). Defense was tendered to Allstate, and 
Allstate settled the counterclaim against its insured, Pennington, and Pennington's 
complaint and Defendant Associates in Radiology's counterclaim were dismissed with 
prejudice (R. 1127-1128). 
Defendant Dr. Bryson Smith was served on May 11, 1994. A Default Certificate 
was entered on August 29, 1994 (R. 162-165). On July 31, 1995, counsel for Pennington 
and counsel for Allstate stipulated to dismissal of Dr. Smith (R. 505). An Order of 
Dismissal was signed by the trial court on August 24, 1995 (R. 613-614, Addendum K). 
Attorney Wilson argues now on appeal Dr. Smith should have had a default judgment 
entered against him. Inasmuch as Pennington agreed to the dismissal, this argument is 
moot. 
Defendants Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David Trimble, D.C, and Dr. Dale Bennett, 
D.C. were served with the summons and complaint (per representation of Attorney Dan 
Wilson) and signed the dismissal agreement (per representation of Attorney Dan Wilson) 
(R. 712). Per stipulation of the parties, an Order of Dismissal was signed by the trial 
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court on August 24, 1995, dismissing with prejudice Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David 
Trimble, D.C. and Dr. Dale Bennett (R. 613-614, Addendum K). 
During the discovery phase, numerous requests for hearings and numerous 
motions were filed by Pennington. On August 16, 1995, documents filed by Attorney 
Wilson for Pennington consisted of 77 pages (R. 532-609). Numerous hearings were 
conducted, and the same issue argued numerous times (for example the Associates in 
Radiology $30 charge was argued at least three separate times) (see trial court index). 
On May 22, 1995, Attorney Wilson sent a letter and his time records to Hal 
Palmer of Allstate with a copy to Allstate's attorney indicating he would be willing to 
resolve the matter at $100 per hour for 74.7 hours. This would have amounted to $7,470 
(R. 663-678). He later informed counsel his hourly charge was $125. By extrapolating 
his fee through the end of trial, Attorney Wilson would have incurred $51,027 in attorney 
fees which he wanted Allstate to pay to him (R. 1034). 
When trial commenced on February 22, 1996, Pennington was not exposed to any 
medical providers in that all defendants had been dismissed. The only reason the trial 
continued was an effort by Attorney Wilson to get Allstate to pay his attorney fees for his 
filing the action against Allstate for his son-in-law (Vol. 1 T. 1169). 
Trial was held on this matter on February 22, 23, 26, 27, 1996 (R. 797-815). The 
trial court actively participated in trial and reviewed volumes of evidence, kept extensive 
personal notes, reviewed all the exhibits in evidence as well as documents filed by each 
side, including numerous memorandum, and carefully observed the demeanor of the 
witnesses during their testimony and reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and 
untruthfulness of the witnesses (R.1081). 
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Closing arguments were originally scheduled for February 28, 1996, but were 
continued to March 1, 1996, because of a conflict in scheduling by the court (R. 815). 
Attorney for Allstate did not get word the closing arguments were scheduled on March 1, 
1996, and was in the hospital on that date running tests (Vol. 4 T. 1941-1942). (Attorney 
Wilson argues the trial court should have awarded Pennington attorney fees because of 
this miscommunication. Such an award is not justified under the facts or law of this 
case). Written notice was then sent by the court for closing arguments on March 15, 1996 
(R. 819). On March 15, 1996, Attorney Dan Wilson called Dr. Trimble as a rebuttal 
witness. Closing arguments were heard in the afternoon, and Pennington did not attend 
(Vol. 5 T. 2040). Attorney Wilson read the newspaper during closing argument (Vol. 5 
T. 2075). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court (Addendum L, M, N) 
The trial court determined the lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith and was 
an abusive use of the courts (R. 1100). The court found Pennington had an 
uncomplicated cervical strain, and the treatment plan by Dr. Taylor was a standard and 
proper treatment (R. 1091). The court further found that if Pennington would have 
followed Dr. Taylor's recommendations, his injury would have been resolved as soon, or 
possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently damaging stressful chiropractic 
manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous other medical 
providers (R. 1091-1092). 
The court further found the purpose of the numerous other medical providers was 
so Pennington could incur medical expenses above the $3,000 PIP in order to sue the 
other driver (R. 1092). Further, Allstate paid several claims submitted to it for 
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unnecessary and unreasonable treatment but should not be punished for these payments 
because Pennington was somewhat successful in deceiving Allstate (R. 1099). 
The court also awarded attorney fees to Allstate based in part on Attorney 
Wilson's questionable conduct in attempting to obtain releases from medical providers 
and at least implying to those medical providers he would protect their interests even 
though he was suing them (R. 1101). The court also found Attorney Wilson attempted to 
force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses incurred by Pennington and 
threatened Allstate with the fact he would recover several thousands of dollars in 
attorney's fees under the PIP statute for bringing this action while he knew or should have 
known most of the medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable (R. 1101). 
Finally, the court awarded judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000 
because of the misconduct in bringing this "spurious action" which was "without merit 
and not in good faith" (R. 1083). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses Against 
Dan Wilson and His Son-in-Law, Lorin Pennington 
The trial court was extremely concerned about the motivation of Attorney Dan 
Wilson and his son-in-law, Lorin Pennington in bringing this lawsuit (R. 1100). The 
court found Pennington engaged in intentional conduct of incurring unnecessary medical 
treatment and engaged in conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and force Allstate 
to pay for those bills (R. 1100). Specifically, the trial court, from his advantaged position 
of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and in review of the exhibits, found (1) Mr. 
Pennington willfully failed to follow his treating physician's properly prescribed 
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treatment plan; (2) chose to 'shop' for other medical providers with the intent of creating 
unnecessary medical bills; (3) utilized Attorney Dan Wilson's personal chiropractor and 
long time acquaintance as one of those unnecessary medical providers; (4) willfully 
exaggerated his symptoms in order to make his injury seem more severe than it was; (5) 
intentionally created medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the $3,000 PIP cap under 
Utah law in order to pursue a personal injury claim and thereby wrongfully receive a 
several thousand dollar's settlement against the other driver; (6) never was diagnosed 
with any objective filings to support any injury or treatment beyond Dr. Taylor's original 
diagnosis and treatment; (7) the plaintiff or his attorney's failed to notify Allstate of the 
filing of the complaint against the other driver, and the resulting settlement against the 
other driver as required by the insurance contract and attorney ethics; (8) questionable 
conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting (and in some instances succeeding) to obtain 
releases from medical providers and implying to those providers he would protect their 
interests as much as they could expect their claims to be protected by their own attorney 
even though he was the attorney representing the party suing them; (9) an attempt by 
Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses incurred 
by the plaintiff; (10) obstructionist conduct by Attorney Wilson to avoid or delay medical 
examination by Allstate's doctor; and (11) Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout 
the case that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees under the 
PIP statute for bringing this action while he knew or should have known, most of the 
medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable (R. 1085-1 111). 
A. Attorney Fees Were Properly Awarded Against Pennington Under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended). 
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The first basis for the award of attorney fees against Pennington was under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended)(R. 1082). Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as 
amended) provides as follows: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the 
action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
(1) Lack of Good Faith. The trial court in the Judgment and Findings of 
Fact found this lawsuit was not brought in good faith (R. 1083, 1088, 1092-1096, 1098-
1104). "This lack of good faith turns on subjective intent, and for purposes of the statute 
is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah 
App. 1991). "While there may be a distinction between bad faith and "lack of good faith" 
in other areas of the law, for purposes of U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78-27-56, the two terms are 
synonymous." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149,152 (Utah 1983). 
The issue of bad faith is a question of fact to be ascertained by the trier of fact and 
is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id.; see also Topik v. Thurber, 739 
P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 534 
n. 3 (Utah 1993); Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court must have found one of the following elements was lacking in order to 
determine the suit was brought in bad faith: "(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) 
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no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, 
delay or defraud others." Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), quoting from 
Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Derber, 481 P.2d 585 (Wash. App. 1971). 
From the facts and evidence introduced at trial, the trial court determined: "it 
was plaintiffs purpose to deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance carrier. . 
." (R. 1099, par. 41). Specifically, the trial court found Pennington willfully failed to 
followed Dr. Taylor's properly prescribed treatment plan (R. 1100, par. 46). Pennington 
intentionally created unnecessary medical bills by shopping for other medical providers in 
order to exceed the $3,000 PIP limit so he could sue the other driver and willfully 
exaggerated his symptoms in order to make them seem more severe than they were (R. 
1092, par. 23,1100, par. 46). 
In regard to Attorney Wilson's actions, the trial court determined his conduct was 
questionable in suing medical providers while at the same time telling the providers the 
lawsuit against them was a sham and implying he would protect their interests (R.l 101). 
Further, Attorney Wilson failed to tell the medical providers if they signed the dismissal 
agreement, sufficient funds were not available from Allstate to pay each defendant. In 
addition, Attorney Wilson offered to provide the very defendants he was suing, an 
attorney, for free, if the matter went to trial (R. 1103). Attorney Wilson further threatened 
employees at Allstate that if Allstate refused to pay medical expenses and treatment when 
he knew or should have known it was unreasonable, he would recover all his attorney's 
fees and costs in the lawsuit. Attorney Wilson informed Allstate employees he had 
convinced Pennington to not see so many health care providers; yet, he thereafter 
informed the health care providers he felt their services were reasonable and necessary. 
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Attorney Wilson further, even inappropriately, indicated to these defendants he wanted to 
get at Allstate for not paying the PIP benefits to the extent of providing them free legal 
service to fight Pennington's own insurance company (R. 1103-1104). 
Any one of these actions would satisfy one or all of the elements which establish a 
lack of good faith on Pennington's part in bringing the law suit. The trial court, with the 
opportunity to view and assess the demeanor of witnesses and attorneys first hand, found 
the requisite facts to sustain a finding of lack of good faith. A reading of the record 
likewise can lead this Court to the conclusion his determination of those facts was not 
"clearly erroneous." 
(2) Without Merit. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended), the 
trial court must also make the determination the case was brought "without merit." "To 
prove that a claim is "without merit" under the statute, the party asserting an award of 
attorney fees must first demonstrate the claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah 
App. 1991), quoting from Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). In Cady, the 
Utah Supreme Court further explained: 
The dictionary definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." While there may be some distinction between 
these two terms in other areas of the law, for purposes of this statute we believe 
the terms are synonymous. While this definition may lack some of the nuances 
found in common law definitions, it adequately serves the purpose of the statute 
before us and is clearly understood. 
Id. "The "without merit" determination is a question of law. . ." and is reviewed for 
"correctness." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202,203 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Based upon the facts presented to the trial court, Pennington had no legal claim 
for any of the funds he sought from Allstate. He was in violation of his contract with 
Allstate at the time of his lawsuit against Allstate. Pennington clearly had no legal basis 
for recovery of any additional expenses which were incurred by him solely for the 
purpose of having enough medical expenses ($3,000) to bring his third party claim. The 
trial court correctly applied the legal standard to the facts, and the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended) for awarding attorney's fees were completely 
satisfied. Attorney fees against Pennington, and Attorney Wilson should be affirmed. 
B. Attorney Fees and Costs Are Proper Under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 
(1986 as amended). 
The trial court also opined attorney fees may also be proper under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1986 as amended)(R. 1082). Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.6 provides as 
follows: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28,1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
The insurance contract between Pennington and Allstate in regard to Personal 
Injury Protection (PIP) benefits adopts by specific reference the Utah Insurance Code (R. 
372-399). Under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(d) (1953 as amended), an insured, who 
believes he has been wrongfully denied payment of PIP benefits, is to sue his insurance 
carrier under his contract for those benefits. The Insurance Code provides as follows: (d) 
The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the 
expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any 
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overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's 
fee to the claimant (emphasis added)." Under the writing of the statute, adopted by the 
contract, the reciprocal right is also true. If an insurer, Allstate, has been wrongfully sued 
by its insured, the insured, Pennington, should likewise be required to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the insurer, Allstate. 
The statute also awards costs and expenses which were properly awarded by the 
trial court. 
C. Other Legal Basis' for Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Although not specifically cited by the trial court, attorney fees could have been 
awarded by the trial court against Attorney Dan Wilson and Pennington on several other 
legal theories argued in the lower court (R. 1019-1053). As this Court has stated in Limb 
v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222,461 P.2d 290,293 n. 2 (1969): 
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed 
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is 
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and 
was not considered or passed on by the lower court." 
(quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1)). 
(1) Violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 11, provides as follows: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney . . . The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
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litigation. . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(emphasis added). "The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on 
an objective basis." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah App. 1989). 
Utah courts have great leeway under Rule 11 to tailor the sanction to fit the requirement 
of the particular case. Id. 
The trial court made several factual findings supporting a finding of a Rule 11 
violation including the frivolous filing of the lawsuit by Attorney Wilson, the filing of the 
lawsuit against medical providers while telling them the filing was a sham and Attorney 
Wilson would provide an attorney to represent them on the suit free of charge, bringing a 
lawsuit against Dr. Joan Balcombe without a legal basis, needless filings of motions to 
harass and increase the cost of litigation, and filing an action for inflated attorney fees on 
an action which could have been filed in Small Claims Court and settled in one day. 
What is interesting to note is Attorney Wilson recently filed an appeal on another 
case involving damages less than $1,500 (including attorney fees) against an insurance 
company. See Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1997). His 
awarded attorney fees in that case were only $300 (a far cry from the extrapolated 
$51,027 in attorney fees he wanted in this case). 
The trial court specifically found Attorney Wilson and Pennington brought this 
suit in bad faith and as an abusive use of the courts. Accordingly, under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 11, the attorneys fee award should be upheld. Further, under Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, the costs awarded are also entirely appropriate as 
reasonable expenses incurred by Allstate, which in justice, Pennington and his attorney 
should pay because of their conduct. 
(2) The Lawsuit Was Brought as a Declaratory Judgment Which Allows a Trial 
Court to Award Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. Under the case of Western Casualty 
Insurance Company v. Marchant 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), this Court established that 
attorneys' fees may be awarded under a declaratory judgment action. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-33-10 (1953 as amended) provides that "a court may make such award of cost that 
may seem equitable and just." The Supreme Court in the Western Casualty case stated: 
The basic rule which this Court has declared and long adhered to is that 
attorneys' fees are not to be allowed unless they are provided for by contract or by 
statute or where they are a legitimate item of damages caused by the other party's 
wrongful act. As an extension of the latter proposition, we have no doubt that the 
statutory authorization to award such "costs as may seem equitable and just" may 
include an award of attorneys' fees if they were necessarily incurred because of 
litigation which was not resorted to in good faith, but was merely spiteful, 
contentious or obstructive. 
The trial court has specifically entered the factual finding that Pennington's 
purpose was to deceive the medical providers and Allstate (R. 1099). The court found the 
lawsuit was spurious, without merit and not in good faith (R. 1083). Accordingly, 
attorney fees could have been properly awarded under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Inasmuch as the Act specifically allows the award of equitable costs, the trial court's 
award of costs likewise should be upheld. 
(3) Pennington's Breach of Duty of Good Faith with Allstate Warrants an 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. Pennington had an insurance contract with Allstate. 
Pennington ignored the insurance contract provisions. Pennington ignored his duties and 
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obligations under his insurance contract with Allstate. The trial court found the action 
was not brought in good faith. According to the insurance contract and contract law 
relating to insurance and breach of good faith, attorneys' fees and costs should be 
awarded. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
(4) Attorney fees and costs are proper under the Utah Supreme Court's 
Rationale in Barnard v. Wassermann. The Utah Supreme Court has long adhered to the 
rationale that attorneys and their clients should be sanctioned where cases are brought 
because of the inappropriate behavior of plaintiff s counsel and plaintiff. In this litigious 
society with overcrowding of the courts, frivolous lawsuits should be sanctioned. 
Attorneys who bring lawsuits for the wrong reason, along with their clients, should bear 
the burden of paying for their wrongful actions. The party wrongfully sued should not. 
Attorney fees are proper in this action "to compensate for time lost and inconvenience 
occasioned by" Attorney Wilson's behavior and that of his client. Barnard v. 
Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). In the Barnard case the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Rather, the court was properly exercising its inherent power to enforce 
compliance with its rules. As we noted nearly a century ago: 
"It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction 
possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are 
the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the 
regulation of the business before the court,... to recall and control its process, to 
direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such, and to suspend, disbar, 
and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the 
proper discharge of their duties.... [Absent legislative limitations] a constitutional 
court of general and superior jurisdiction may exercise such inherent powers and 
summary jurisdiction as the necessity of the case may require, and in [a] manner 
comporting with a proper discharge of its duties in the premises... 
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The summary jurisdiction which the court has over its attorneys as officers 
of the court... is inherent, continuing, and plenary ... and ought to be assumed and 
exercised ... not only to maintain and protect the integrity and dignity of the court, 
to secure obedience to its rules and process, and to rebuke interference with the 
conduct of its business, but also to control and protect its officers, including 
attorneys." 
In re Evans. 42 Utah 282,130 P. 217, 224-25 (1913) (emphasis added); 
see also In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 303 (Utah 1933) (noting 
inherent power to discipline attorneys in discussion of court's power to suspend 
attorneys from practice); In re Burton, 67 Utah 118,246 P. 188,199 (1926) 
(describing court's inherent power to deal with its own officers, including 
attorneys). 
As we suggested in In re Evans, courts of general jurisdiction, such as the 
district court in this case, possess certain inherent power to impose monetary 
sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and 
movement of cases through the court. 130 P. at 224; see also Jean E. Maess, 
Annotation, Authority of Trial Judge to Impose Costs or Other Sanctions Against 
Attorney Who Fails to Appear at, or Proceed with, Scheduled Trial, 29 A.L.R.4th 
160 (1984). Similarly, trial courts in the federal system have such inherent power. 
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 
(1980); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Inherent Power of Federal District 
Court to Impose Monetary Sanctions on Counsel in Absence of Contempt of 
Court, 77 A.L.R.Fed. 789 (1986). This inherent power of trial courts is separate 
and distinct from the contempt powers they may exercise in appropriate cases. 
A court's power to enforce its rules implies the existence of a mechanism 
for enforcement. That mechanism may take a variety of forms, one example of 
which is the assessment of attorney fees. Without sanctions, the power to 
enforce would be meaningless. As well as being consistent with our precedent in 
this area, this result also comports with the trial court's statutory authority to 
control proceedings before it. Utah Code Ann. Sees. 78-7-5, 78-7-17. 
Id. at 248-249. 
This case falls under the trial court's power to impose attorney fees on a 
meaningless misuse of the courts by the filing of a frivolous lawsuit. Sanctions, in terms 
of attorney fees and costs and expenses, were warranted to impress upon the attorney of 
record, Wilson, and his client that Utah courts will not abide by being used as vehicles of 
harassment, bribery, or other unlawful or wrongful purposes. 
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D. The Trial Court Did Not Erred in Not Granting Sanctions Against Allstate's 
Attorney in Regard to Pennington's Motions to Compel. 
On February 19, 1994, Pennington filed an action against the driver of the other 
vehicle. This action was settled on March 17, 1994. Counsel for Allstate believed this 
minor case would thereafter be dismissed because research indicated under the case of 
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), Pennington was 
now attempting a double recovery of his medical expenses. Allstate, through counsel, 
presented this analysis to Pennington's counsel. When it began apparent, Pennington was 
seeking a double recovery, the interrogatory answers and documents were provided (R. 
193-201). 
Pennington also filed a Motion to Compel on Pennington's Third Set of 
Interrogatories. Counsel for Allstate was experiencing severe health difficulties of which 
Attorney Wilson was aware. Numerous courtesies have been extended to Attorney 
Wilson on this appeal because of health problems; however, Attorney Wilson filed a 
Motion to Compel while Allstate's counsel was ill. The trial court was aware of the 
health difficulties, and no order to compel was issued. 
In reviewing the trial court's action, this Court needs to make a finding the trial 
court abused its discretion by not imposing sanctions. W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977). A mere filing of a motion to compel 
does not justify automatic imposition of sanctions. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
37(a)(4) provides the trial court need not award expenses when "the court finds that the 
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust." The trial court refused to grant sanctions given the 
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circumstances of the entire case, as well as the misconduct of plaintiff s counsel in the 
case. The trial court's decision should be upheld. 
E. The Trial Court's Award of Costs Was Proper. 
The lower court awarded costs to Allstate in the amount of $6,148.15 (R. 954, 
1054-1056). Allstate initially requested costs in the amount of $7,185.55 (R. 913-916). 
Plaintiff did not, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(2), file a motion 
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. Instead, plaintiff objected to the costs. 
Allstate filed a memorandum in support of the costs (R. 944-952). The court reviewed 
the memorandums on file and ruled the costs of $6,148.15 were properly awarded against 
the plaintiff (R. 954, 1054-1056). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: f,[t]he determination to award taxable costs 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse 
of that discretion." Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah 
1993). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: f'[t]he trial court may exercise 
reasonable discretion in awarding taxable costs," Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 
316 (Utah 1991). The trial court reviewed the costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action incurred because of the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney's actions and made the 
determination as to which costs were appropriate. This Court should uphold his decision. 
Pennington complains some inappropriate expenses were included. Pennington 
complains of deposition costs being taxed. Allstate requested only the expense it incurred 
in obtaining a transcript of depositions taken by Pennington. Pennington took the 
depositions and cannot now argue he really did not need those to prepare for his case. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Pennington complains Allstate 
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necessarily incurred costs to call expert witnesses to refute his unfounded accusations. A 
trial court may award costs of any expert witness which is indicated might be called at the 
time of trial. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993). The expert witness fees 
were properly awarded. 
Finally, the costs and expenses awarded are proper if they can be awarded under 
any legal ground or theory presented in the lower court. Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969). As indicated, such costs 
and expenses are appropriate under Rule 11, Declaratory Judgment Act, Pennington's 
breach of duty of good faith, or a Barnard v. Wassermann analysis. The trial court's 
award of costs should be upheld. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
This Court has consistently held summary judgment is only proper when the 
pleadings before the trial court establish no genuine issue of material fact. Ross v. 
Schackel 920 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1996); Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 
1984). As stated by this Court in the Snvder case: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits, and admissions submitted in a case show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. It should be granted only when is clearly appears that there is 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail 
Id. 
The complaint filed by Mr. Pennington asks the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing on whether the medical services received by him and medical expenses incurred 
were reasonable and necessary for the treatment of injuries received by him (R. 004). The 
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issue before the trial court was the treatment viewed in its entirety not in isolation. See 
also Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), "personal injury protection 
coverages and benefits include (a) The reasonable value of all expenses for necessary 
medical . . . services." A party moved against need only to demonstrate some factual 
disputes are in question. The defendant need not establish and prove his legal theory, he 
only need establish and show facts exist which controvert the facts stated in the moving 
parties' affidavits. Salt Lake City Court v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah 
App. 1988). The trial court ruled a factual dispute existed as to the reasonableness and 
necessity of the Associates in Radiology $30 charge in view of the entire issues for trial. 
The trial court also determined at trial the Associates in Radiology charge was not 
necessary (as well as all additional treatment sought by Mr. Pennington beyond that 
recommended by Dr. Taylor) (R. 1081-1111). 
A. The Law of the Case Was a Factual Dispute Existed as to the Reasonableness 
and Necessity of the $30 Associates in Radiology Charge Prior to Mr. Pennington's 
Filing His Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Pennington, through his attorney, Dan Wilson, filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on December 8, 1994, requesting the court to grant partial summary 
judgment against Allstate for its refusal to pay for claimed "reasonable and necessary" 
charges from Burns Chiropractic, Bennett Chiropractic, St. Benedict's Hospital and 
Associates in Radiology. 
To dispute the reasonableness and necessity of the charges, Allstate Insurance Co. 
had filed with the court the following information: (1) an affidavit of Clay Hamblen, the 
Allstate Ogden claims adjuster who had direct control of the matter (R. 014-015). His 
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affidavit stated Allstate denied payment for the medical expenses because an independent 
medical provider determined the expenses were not reasonable and also determined the 
medical providers' services were unreasonable and unnecessary. 
The record before the trial court also included (2) an affidavit of Jay Marks, the 
Unit Claims Manager over the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) claims for Allstate's 
Ogden office (Mr. Hamblen's supervisor) (R. 292-294). His affidavit indicated the 
payments not made were based upon the independent medical provider's review that any 
further payments would not be reasonable given the minor injury to Mr. Pennington and 
the unreasonableness and excessive treatments of the providers (R. 292-302). 
In opposition to the motion, Allstate also filed (3) an affidavit of Dr. Nathaniel M. 
Nord with accompanying exhibits (R. 303-313, Addendum G). Dr. Nord stated: "My 
review of the medical reports, medical expenses, medical treatment, and in speaking to 
and personally examining Mr. Pennington, has led me to the conclusion that Mr. 
Pennington sustained no more than a cervical strain as a result of the motor vehicle 
accident on June 18, 1993. After that accident, Mr. Pennington generated undue personal 
concern as to his condition which led to the involvement of an excessive number of 
practitioners. This undue personal concern led to his generating some duplicative 
treatment and expenses which were not necessary." Further, in Dr. Nord's report attached 
as an exhibit to his affidavit, he stated: "Other than the continuation of a home exercise 
program already established, and follow-ups as needed with his primary care physician, 
Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical follow is indicated." 
Specifically in regard to the x-rays, Dr. Nord testified: "Further, Mr. Pennington 
received numerous x-rays in relationship to this motor vehicle accident, including x-rays 
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taken on July 1, 1993, at St. Benedict's Hospital (which were normal); x-rays taken on 
July 6, 1993, at the Burns Chiropractic Clinic (which were normal); x-rays taken on July 
15, 1993, at the Bennett Chiropractic Clinic (which were normal except for a mild 
thoracolumbar scoliosis); and a cervical MRI scan taken August 3,1993, at St. Benedict's 
Hospital (which was also normal). This further reflects Mr. Pennington's undue 
solicitation of various providers and services" (R. 304-305, Addendum G). 
In support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff only submitted an 
affidavit of Paul R. Jensen, M.D., who was an employee of Associates in Radiology, who 
testified the charges were reasonable (R. 274-276). However, the affidavit specifically 
declined to address the issue of necessity. 
Oral argument occurred on the motion for summary judgment on March 13, 1995 
(R. 450-451). The minute entry states: "Daniel Wilson is requesting the Court grant 
Summary Judgment as to Associates in Radiology, in the amount of $30.00 for the X-
Ray, as to Bums Chiropractic, and as to Bennet (sic) Chiropractic." The court thereafter 
denied the motion on March 29, 1995, because a question of fact existed which needed to 
be resolved by an evidentiary hearing (R. 454). 
Thereafter, plaintiff filed another partial motion for summary judgment on the 
identical Associates in Radiology $30 charge (R. 452). No new evidence was filed in 
support of the motion. (Mr. Pennington did resubmit a prior affidavit of Dr. Balcombe 
which had been filed in support of her Motion to Dismiss (see R. 285-288; 464-467). Dr. 
Balcombe's affidavit only stated the "emergency room" standard of care was to take x-
rays. She did not testify in relation to medical necessity and reasonableness of the x-rays 
in light of Mr. Pennington's excessive treatment and excessive x-rays. The trial court 
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summarily denied the Motion stating factual issues still needed to be resolved (R. 504-
506, 679-680). Attorney Wilson somehow convinced the trial court to again rehear the 
argument on August 31,1995. The trial court again denied the Motion on September 13, 
1995 (R. 768-769). The court also refused to grant another rehearing requested by 
Attorney Wilson on the second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed October 19, 
1995 (R. 956). 
When the trial court ruled factual issues existed in relation to Associates in 
Radiology $30 charge in regard to Pennington's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on March 29, 1995, that decision became the "law of the case" as to Associates in 
Radiology $30 charge. Once the trial court had entered the law of the case, the trial court 
did not have any further obligation to reopen the issue. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 
P.2d 42,44-46 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Thurston this Court defined the law of the case doctrine as follows: 
The "law of the case" is a legal doctrine under which a decision made 
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). The doctrine was 
developed in the interest of economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and 
difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on 
matters previously decided in the same case. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah 
CtApp.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (1993); see also 18 Charles A. Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 
(1981) [hereinafter Wright]; IB James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
|0.404 [hereinafter Moore]. 
Id. The law of the case terminology justifies "a trial court's refusal to reconsider matters 
in a continuing proceeding..." Id. at 1034. 
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Once the trial court judge determined factual issues existed in relationship to the 
$30 Associates in Radiology charge, the trial court judge had no obligation or 
responsibility to allow continued argument on the issue. The trial court judge did not 
have any responsibility to reopen an issue he had already decided. As stated by this Court 
in Thurston: 
Under this branch, a court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters it 
resolved in a prior ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and 
consistency. The doctrine is not a limit on power but, "as applied to the effect of 
previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, 
merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been 
decided." Messenger v. Anderson. 225 U.S. 436,444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 
1152 (1912); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618-19 & n. 8,103 
S.Ct. 1382,1391-92 & n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983). It rests on " 'good sense and 
the desire to protect both court and parties against the burdens of repeated 
reargument by indefatigable diehards.'" In re Department of Energy Stripper 
Well Exemption Litig., 821 F.Supp. 1432,1434 (D.Kan.1993) (quoting Wright § 
4478, at 790). 
Id. at 1038-1039. 
A lower court may reopen an issue only if exceptional circumstances are present. 
These exceptional circumstances are narrowly defined to "(1) when there has been an 
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become 
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous 
and would work a manifest injustice." Id. The law of the case doctrine is especially 
applicable "when, in the case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present 
the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced." Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988); see also, 
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Richardson v. 
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Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 Utah 2d 415, 
510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973). 
In reviewing the lower court's record, no new authority was cited in Pennington's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment to justify the court reopening the issue of the $30 
Associates in Radiology charge. Pennington cited no new evidence. No reason was 
given to justify reopening the issue. 
In response to Pennington's second motion, defendant Allstate also filed an 
additional affidavit stating the $30 bill had not been received (R. 400-403). The affidavit 
was unnecessary in that the court had already ruled from the facts presented a factual 
issue existed as to the reasonableness and necessity of the charge. Thereafter, counsel for 
Allstate reviewed the original file on September 1, 1995, and found the bill in Allstate's 
file but never entered in Allstate's computer record. Counsel for Allstate immediately 
informed the court by memorandum and also indicated Dr. Nord had the bill in his initial 
evaluation (R. 720-723). With this information, the court again denied plaintiffs Motion 
(R. 768-769). 
The trial court consistently followed the law of the case regarding the disputed 
reasonableness and necessity of Associates in Radiology charge. No additional hearing 
was required or necessary. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of 
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and the 
difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same propositions in 
the same case." Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). The 
trial court allowed Pennington three different times to argue his motion and consistently 
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ruled a question of fact existed. Under the law of the case doctrine, the trial court did not 
have any responsibility to grant another hearing on the same issue. 
B. Pennington's Motion to Reconsider Was Appropriately Denied. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to reconsider is not expressly 
available. Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980). The rationale for not allowing 
multiple motions to reconsider was precisely addressed by this Court in Drury v. 
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966) as follows: 
When this has been done and the court has ruled upon the motion, if the 
party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for 
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, 
why should not be other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a 
motion for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again reverse himself? 
Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures 
and theoretically a judge could go on reversing himself periodically at the 
entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad infinitum. This reflection brings 
one to realize what an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a judge could carry in 
his mind indefinitely a state of uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the 
matter should be. 
Mr. Pennington's counsel persuaded the trial court to listen to argument on the 
$30 Associates in Radiology charge three different times. Every time the trial court ruled 
against Mr. Pennington. His continued litigious requests cost the court and Allstate time 
and expense. No additional time should have been spent by the trial court on another 
motion to reconsider. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Mr. Pennington, through his counsel, Dan Wilson, mounts an attack against the 
trial court's detailed and precise findings of fact and claims these facts are against the 
clear weight of the evidence. In reality, the approach taken by Pennington and Attorney 
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Wilson on appeal is simply an attempt to reargue his position based on selective excerpts 
of evidence presented to the trial court. Pennington fails to establish the findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), "Findings of fact. . . 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.'*; see also, State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988), ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 
247, 255 (Utah App. 1997), Sew v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 
634 (Utah 1995), MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995), In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
As the Utah Court of Appeals explained in ProMax, 
On the other hand, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear 
error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 
P.2d 472,476 (Utah.Ct.App.1991). To succeed in its challenge to findings of fact, 
ProMax may not simply reargue its position based on selective excerpts of 
evidence presented to the trial court. See DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 
1353,1360 (Utah 1994) (rejecting sufficiency of evidence challenge where 
appellant "essentially reargue[d] the evidence as if [the] appeal were a trial de 
novo."); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah.Ct.App.1994) (noting appellant's argument was "nothing more than an 
attempt to reargue the case before this court—a tactic that we reject."). Instead, 
ProMax must "first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil 
& Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 773 (Utah 1995); accord 
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53. 
Id. 
A. Pennington's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because He Has Failed to 
Marshall the Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Demonstrate 
This Evidence is Insufficient. 
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In support of the judgment the trial court's findings of fact include 20 pages of 
specific findings (R. 1085-1104). On appeal, Mr. Pennington must marshal all the 
evidence supporting the findings. He must then demonstrate to this Court that even 
viewing the findings of fact in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-1070 
(Utah 1985). Charlton v. Hackett 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961) This Court has consistently 
held: 
An appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury nor the 
findings of fact made by a trial court. If a challenge is made to the findings, 
an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the 
trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings of fact. If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the 
trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) further emphasize the importance 
of the lower court's findings of fact. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses" 
(emphasis added). 
Pennington has spent considerable time marshaling the evidence supporting his 
arguments to the lower court. The trial court in his advantaged position rejected this 
evidence. He now attempts to reargue those facts on appeal to this Court. In doing so, 
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Pennington has failed to follow this Court's rule that he must first marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact, and then show this Court this evidence 
(overwhelming in this case) is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact. 
Pennington has failed to do so, and this Court should assume the record supports the trial 
court's findings of fact. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are Supported by the Evidence. 
In review of the lower court's findings of fact, deference should be given by this 
Court to the trial court's advantaged position to observe testimony first hand. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a). The lower court's record demonstrates the trial court 
judge actively participated in the trial and in judging and assessing the credibility of the 
witnesses (R. 1082, Judgment, "the court having reviewed the volumes of evidence 
produced, his extensive personal notes taken during several days of trials and hearings, all 
exhibits in evidence, documents filed by each side, including numerous memorandum, 
and having carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses during the testimony and having 
reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and untruthfulness of these witnesses. . ."). A 
review of the findings demonstrates immense support for the trial court's decision. 
Specifically, Pennington argues findings of fact 21, 23 and 24 are not supported 
by the record. These findings are as follows: 
21. The court further finds that the recommendations and treatment plan 
established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper treatment reasonable for this 
type of cervical strain injury and had Mr. Pennington followed Dr. Taylor's 
recommendation, this injury would have probably been resolved as soon, or 
possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently damaging stressful 
chiropractic manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous 
other medical providers. 
23. The court finds that rather than continue with Dr. Taylor, Mr. 
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Pennington chose to 'shop' for other medical providers for the purpose of 
increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the $3,000 PIP amounts in 
order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim against the other driver 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953 as amended). 
24. The court finds that the further medical treatment obtained by 
plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was not only unnecessary, 
but some of that treatment was given to areas of the body not injured in the 
accident, and certain treatment probably increased plaintiffs pain and was 
the cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above 
that caused by the June 18th accident. 
(R. 1091-1092). 
The testimony at trial proved Mr. Pennington suffered injury of an minor, 
uncomplicated cervical strain in the motor vehicle accident of June 18, 1993 (T. Vol. 2, 
1413 (testimony of Dr. Nord); T. Vol. 1, 1220 (testimony of Dr. Balcombe); T. Vol. 3, 
1820 (testimony of Dr. Wakefield). A cervical strain is a strain of a muscle. Time is the 
healer of Mr. Pennington's type of injury; any treatment is simply for pain purposes and 
not to cure the injury (T. Vol. 2, 1474). Physical therapy or non-manipulative 
chiropractic therapy may reduce the pain, but nature does the healing (T. Vol. 2, 1476-
1477). 
Mr. Pennington went to his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, the day after 
the accident (R. Exhibits, P-1). In accordance with a simple, uncomplicated cervical 
strain, Dr. Paul Taylor recommended "neck flexion exercises," and "ice, heat, rest, and 
Iboprofen." (Id.) Mr. Pennington's range of motion was "complete." (Id.) He again saw 
Dr. Taylor on June 22, 1993, and Dr. Taylor simply recommended "doing more neck and 
shoulder exercises, ice and then heat and muscle relaxant." (Id.) 
Witnesses testified Dr. Taylor's care was entirely appropriate (T. Vol. 2, 1411 
(testimony of Dr. Nord); T. Vol. 3, 1801 (testimony of Dr. Wakefield). Other than the 
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continuation of the home exercise program established by Dr. Taylor and follow-ups as 
needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical 
follow-up was necessary (T. Vol. 2, 1441). 
Mr. Pennington does not return to his primary health care provider, Dr. Paul 
Taylor. His attorney argued the reason he did not return was because he did trust his 
primary health care provider. However, the evidence in the record before the court was 
Mr. Pennington still listed Dr. Taylor as his primary health care provider when he was 
seeing Bennett Chiropractic (Exhibit P-6). So in an effort to increase his PIP threshold 
limit, Mr. Pennington seeks a third physical examination from Dr. Joan Balcombe, an 
Emergency Room physician at St. Benedict's hospital. Dr. Balcombe's examination is 
consistent with Dr. Taylor's. However, she orders x-rays because an Emergency Room 
physician approaches a patient differently than a primary care physician in that they better 
be right the first time because they are not likely going to see the patient again (Vol. 2, T. 
1419). The standard of care is different for an Emergency Room doctor than a treating 
physician (Vol. 2, T. 1418). Dr. Nord would not have ordered x-rays if no objective 
change was observed in Mr. Pennington's physical examination. Dr. Balcombe's 
physical examination had no objective change from Dr. Taylor's examination (Vol. 2, T. 
1416-1417). However, Dr. Balcombe, as an emergency room physician, ordered the x-
rays to avoid malpractice; and because the visit is usually a one-time basis, the emergency 
physician wants to be positive all possible injuries to that patient are covered (Vol. 1, T. 
1234, 1239). The x-rays are normal. (Pennington separately argues the $30 charge from 
Associates in Radiology was reasonable and necessary. The clear weight of the evidence 
was otherwise and supports Allstate's position that Dr. Taylor would not have ordered x-
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rays. The reference to Dr. Nord's testimony is taken out-of-context. In an emergency 
setting, Dr. Nord testified the x-rays would be reasonable. However, he specifically 
testified in regard to this case, he would not have ordered x-rays as Mr. Pennington's 
treating physician (Vol. 2, T. 1415-1417)). 
Mr. Pennington then receives a fourth examination on July 6, 1993, by Dr. 
Trimble at the Burns Chiropractic Clinic. Now, Mr. Pennington is diagnosed with "an 
acute traumatic acceleration/deceleration injury to the cervical spine resulting in 
myofascities with bilateral occupital neuralgia and grade II radiculopathy of the right 
upper extremity and an acute traumatic lumbosacral sprain/strain resulting in myofascitis" 
(R. Exhibit D-44). Mr. Pennington seeks treatment from Burns Chiropractic seven times. 
He receives x-rays from Burns Chiropractic—normal thoracic spine, two views with an 
interpretation; normal lumbar spine, four views with an interpretation. 
On July 15, 1993, Mr. Pennington received a fifth physical examination from 
Bennett Chiropractic. His diagnosis is now "Acute, Moderate to Severe, Constant" (1) 
"Brachial Radicular Neuralgia," (2) "Cervical Hyperflex/Hyperext. Inj.," (3) "Multiple 
Cervical Subluxation," (4) "Thoracic Subluxation Unspec," and (5) "Lumbar 
Subluxation Unspec." (Dist. Ct. Exhibits, D-45, Appendix C). He goes to Bennett 
Chiropractic 20 times receiving spinal manipulations and adjustments to treat problems to 
his thoracic spine, hips, ribs, lumbar spine, and cervical spine (R. Exhibits, P-6). Spinal 
manipulations or adjustments performed by chiropractors involve placement in a certain 
position with sudden forces applied to certain areas of the vertebral column. (Vol. 2, T. 
1423-1427). Yet, Mr. Pennington's injury was to a muscle in the neck; the manipulations 
were to the bony processes. 
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Mr. Pennington again goes to the Emergency Room at St. Benedict's Hospital on 
July 24, 1993. On the day prior he received treatment from Bennett Chiropractic for his 
hips, his ribs, and thoracic pain (R. Exhibit P-6). Mr. Pennington's self report is his chief 
complaint is swelling and pain in the back, worsening the last two daiys. No evidence is 
given for the cause of onset of this increasing swelling and pain; no evidence ties it into 
the automobile accident. Dr. Rollins cannot figure out his problem, so he refers him to a 
neurologist, Dr. Bryson Smith. (Pennington separately argues Allstate should have paid 
for this visit as a normal office visit to Dr. Taylor. The fallacy of this argument is, 
according to other witnesses, Pennington probably did not need to seek Dr. Taylor again 
inasmuch as time is the healer of his injury. Further, Pennington had been receiving 
excessive chiropractic care which witnesses testified was not conducive to good care and 
may have caused additional problems). 
Dr. Smith conducts an MRI, everything is normal, and Mr. Pennington stops 
treatment (although following Dr. Smith's first examination and before the last visit, Mr. 
Pennington continues chiropractic treatment, adds additional physical therapy and 
massage therapy, with some treatment overlapping days). 
Dr. Nord conducted an independent medical examination of Mr. Pennington on 
September 28, 1993. He concluded from his examination and review of the medical 
records that: 
The available medical evidence indicates that Mr. Pennington sustained no 
more than a cervical strain as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of 
June 18, 1993, following which he generated undue personal concern which 
led to involvement of an excessive number of practitioners being involved. 
Other than the continuation of a home exercise program already established, 
and follow-ups as needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, 
no further treatment or medical follow is indicated. The prognosis is 
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excellent, with complete resolution of symptoms a reasonable expectation. 
No activity restrictions are appropriate. 
(R. Exhibits D-13, Addendum G). 
Based on this evidence, and the opportunity of the court to determine the 
truthfulness of the witnesses who testified, the trial court determined the 
recommendations and treatment plan established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper 
treatment reasonable for this type of cervical strain injury (R. 1091). The plan of Dr. 
Taylor consisted of home exercise programs, ice, heat and muscle relaxant (Exhibit P-l). 
Any further treatment, thereafter, was unnecessary (R. 1092) and was sought for the 
purpose of increasing Mr. Pennington's medical expenses in order to exceed the PIP 
threshold to justify a personal injury claim against the other driver (R. 1092). The trial 
court found that Allstate had paid too much (R. 1099). However, payment by Allstate of 
palliative procedures does not establish medical necessity (R. 1099) (Pennington attempts 
to piece meal argue reasonableness and necessity of Bennett Chiropractic, Burns 
Chiropractic, physical therapy, and Dr. Smith. The clear weight of the evidence 
established nothing after Dr. Taylor's second examination was reasonable, and additional 
treatment was sought to inflate a personal injury claim (R. 1091-1092)). 
The trial court, after listening to the testimony of all witnesses, including Mr. 
Pennington, specifically determined the x-rays taken at the Emergency Room were 
unreasonable and unnecessary and were part of the plaintiffs plan to build up the medical 
expenses for his ultimate benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the other driver 
(R. 1098). 
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A review of the trial court's rationale and findings of fact with the evidence 
adduced at trial establishes the trial court had sufficient evidence for its decision. This 
Court should not set aside the trial court's decision supported by the record. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Attorney Wilson filed proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
March 6, 1996 (R. 821-830). In his Findings of Fact, Attorney Wilson stated: "Based on 
the evidence, a reasonable attorney fee is $100 per hour for all time prior to July 15, 1995, 
and $125 per hour for all time from and after July 15, 1995" (R. 828). Between 
November 30, 1993, and May 20, 1995, Attorney Wilson had spent 74.7 hours on this 
matter. 
Allstate's counsel, Jan P. Malmberg, filed an affidavit in support of Allstate's 
request for attorney fees on December 19, 1996 (R. 997-1018). In her affidavit she 
stated: 
7. Numerous pleadings, correspondence, orders, telephone calls and 
depositions were taken throughout the course of this action. By the time of 
tiral, all defendants had been dismissed with the exception of Allstate. Plaintiff, 
himself, had no stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. The lawsuit was 
merely continued because the plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson, wanted this 
court to award his attorney fees to be paid by Allstate even though the 
entire lawsuit against Allstate was without legal basis (R. 997-998). 
Her affidavit further recited that plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson, prepared 93 
separate pleadings; she prepared 79 pleadings. Further, in support of her time, her 
affidavit recited the specific time spent (R. 1000-1017). Mrs. Malmberg billed at a rate of 
$75 an hour. Between February, 1994, and May 20,1995, she spent 55.6 hours. 
The total attorney fees requested were $27,575. In the memorandum in support of 
attorney fees, Allstate claims by extrapolating Mr. Wilson's charges through the end of 
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time, his bill would have been $51,027 in attorney fees, nearly twice as much as 
Allstate's. 
Pennington never filed any memorandum in opposition to the attorney fees 
claimed by Allstate. Pennington never submitted any objection to the reasonableness of 
those fees. Pennington never disputed his counsel had spent approximately $51,000 in 
attorney fees. 
Under Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501, Pennington had 10 days 
to file any affidavits or other documents opposing the reasonableness of Allstate's 
attorney fees. Plaintiff did not file any opposition. For purposes of the record before the 
court at the time of ruling on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the trial court 
had no documentation to challenge any of the claimed attorney fees. Under Rule 52(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pennington waived his right to challenge the attorney 
fees, and attorney fees should have been entered in accordance with the request filed by 
Allstate. 
The Utah Supreme Court had held that while a trial court has discretion to 
determine an award of attorney fees, the exercise of that discretion must be based on an 
evaluation of the evidence. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
An evaluation of the evidence indicates Attorney Wilson's hourly rate was higher. 
Attorney Wilson's spent more hours on the case (at least through May, 1995) than 
counsel for Allstate. Attorney Wilson's total attorney fees would have been 
approximately $51,000. Counsel for Allstate only claimed $27,575. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated the factors the court should analyze in 
awarding attorney fees. In Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
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Supreme Court said the following items should be addressed: "the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved." The trial court specifically found in this case 
serious collateral matters which made the litigation difficult, including the conduct of 
Attorney Wilson and the plaintiffs misconduct (R. 1082). The trial court stated 
excessive time was spent by Allstate's attorney, yet does not specifically identify what 
hours were excessive, especially in light of the evidence which indicated plaintiffs 
counsel spent more. The fee charged by Allstate's attorney was found to be less per hour 
that often charged by attorneys. Thereby, even utilizing the $125 per hour charged by 
plaintiffs counsel, with the 200 hours found reasonable, attorney fees should be at least 
$25,000. 
Finally, in light of the subject matter of this litigation, along with the conduct of 
plaintiffs counsel with plaintiff, and the serious findings by the trial court of the 
misconduct of both in filing a spurious action, all fees incurred by Allstate should be 
awarded. To not award the full attorney fees incurred by Allstate in defending a frivolous 
action would allow Pennington and his attorney to claim victory in their methods in that 
Allstate was required to pay attorney fees and costs on a frivolous lawsuit filed in bad 
faith. Pennington and his attorney, not Allstate should be the party punished for wasting 
this court's time, the lower court's time, and causing Allstate to incur unnecessary 
attorney fills and costs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pennington and his father-in-law and attorney, Dan Wilson, attempted to 
orchestrate a plan which would allow Pennington to bring a third-party action against the 
driver that hit his vehicle when, in reality, he was barely injured. To accomplish this goal, 
Pennington went shopping for various medical providers in an effort to build his case to be 
one over $3,000 in medical expenses. He successfully accomplished his goal, sued the 
third-party, recovered and kept thousands of dollars to which he was not entitled. 
Allstate Insurance Company became suspicious during the course of receiving bills 
from multiple providers on a case which appeared to be an uncomplicated cervical strain 
which would resolve, without treatment, within a few weeks. Allstate exercised its rights 
under its policy to verify its concerns through an independent medical examination. 
Plaintiffs counsel thwarted that attempt until after Pennington could incur his $3,000 in 
medical expenses. Pennington was also successful in obtaining his settlement from a third-
party by violating his insurance contract with his own provider and never notifying them of 
any lawsuit or settlement. 
Successful in receiving money to which Pennington was not entitled, Pennington 
now threatened his own company for challenging his incurrence of unnecessary and 
unreasonable medical expenses. To avoid paying for those costs, a lawsuit was framed to 
sue Allstate and his medical providers while at the same time, attempting to convince 
those medical providers their treatment was reasonable and Pennington was representing 
their interests in the lawsuit, while, in reality, Pennington was attempting to avoid paying 
for those expenses. 
When Allstate finally obtained the result sought by Pennington, i.e. all the medical 
providers being dismissed, Pennington still sought to force his own company to pay for his 
attorney fees. A trial was held. The trial court saw through the volumes of documents, 
pleadings, and arguments made by plaintiffs counsel, and found the lawsuit was not 
brought in good faith, was spurious, and was filed without merit. The trial court found 
Pennington and his attorney attempted to deceive Allstate and the medical providers, and 
entered judgment accordingly. 
The trial record supports the decision of the trial court. This court should affirm 
the ruling of the trial court that this action was spurious, without merit and not in good 
faith. By affirming this conclusion, this Court should likewise award attorney fees in the 
amount claimed at trial (as per the Cross Appeal), costs, and attorney fees and costs on 
appeal under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b). 
DATED this /9 f / ) day of January, 1998. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
a, (?. ^ J L J ^ , 
m P. Malmberg 7T 
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Addendum A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the 
report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple Parties. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(2) Judgment by Default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind 
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in 
a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to 
the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the 
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of 
a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge 
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by 
the court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the 
date judgment is entered. 
(3) and (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment. The clerk must include in 
any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that 
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
Addendum B 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
RULE 33. DAMAGES FOR DELAY OR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL; RECOVERY OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(a) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or 
gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion 
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a 
party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue 
to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages 
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form 
the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral 
argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall 
grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for 
assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals. 
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If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages This is in 
keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure However, the amount of 
damages—single or double costs or attorney fees or both—is left to the discretion of the 
court Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions 
upon the party or upon counsel for the party This rule does not apply to a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case to avoid the conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v 
California, 386 U S 738 (1967) and State v Clayton, 639 P 2d 168 (Utah 1981) Under 
the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the 




TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
§ 31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, 
dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing 
services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss of 
earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive 
weeks after the loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of 
disability, unless the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the 
date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 
days, for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but 
for the injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's 
inability to perform these services continues for more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person; 
and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total 
of $3,000. 
(2)(a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in 
Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309 (l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a 
relative value study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit 
value and determine the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and 
accommodation. The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, 
the department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private medical and 
health agencies or other technical experts. The costs and expenses incurred in 
conducting, maintaining, and administering the relative value study shall be funded by the 
tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall 
prepare and publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th 
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. 
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(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by 
applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or 
accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not 
assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge under the relative value study, the value 
of the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar 
service or accommodation in the most populous county of this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule 
already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets 
the requirements of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of 
overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within 
30 days after such insurer has knowledge of such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party 
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to 
examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's 
medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 31A-
22-309 (l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered 
in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. 
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse 
only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the insured states in 
writing that: 
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's 
spouse received any earned income from regular employment; and 
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of 
insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from 
regular employment. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing 
coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it 
require the segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same 
policy. 
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required 
under this section. 
As last amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1994. 
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Addendum D 
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
§ 31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may 
only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle 
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of 
the insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor 
vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful 
possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor 
vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, 
rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other 
hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be 
contained in other types of coverage. 
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(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an 
accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; 
and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the 
United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the military 
service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy 
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5)(a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made 
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the 
insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the 
period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the 
insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable 
proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear 
interest at the rate of 1- 1/2% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover 
the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay 
any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the 
following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for the 
personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under personal injury 
protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; 
and 
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(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided 
by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
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Allstate Indemnity Company 
The Company Named In the Declarations 
A Stock Company • Home Office • Northbrook, Illinois 
GENERAL 
This policy is a legal contract between you 
and us. A coverage applies only when a 
premium for it is shown on the declarations 
page If more than one auto is insured, 
premiums will be shown for each auto. If 
you pay the premiums when due and comply 
with the policy terms, Allstate, relying on the 
information you have given us, makes the 
following agreements with you. 
When And Where The Policy Applies 
Your policy applies only during the policy 
period During this time, it applies to losses to 
the auto, accidents, and occurrences within 
the United States of America, its territories or 
possessions, or Canada, or between their 
ports The policy period is shown on the 
declarations page. 
Insurance Coverage In Mexico 
Auto accidents in Mexico are subject to the 
laws of Mexico — NOT the United States of 
America In the Republic of Mexico an auto 
accident can be considered a CRIMINAL 
OFFENSE as well as a civil matter. 
In some cases, the coverage under this policy 
may NOT be recognized by Mexican 
authorities and we may not be allowed to 
provide any insurance coverage at all in 
Mexico For your protection, you should 
seriously consider purchasing auto coverage 
from a licensed Mexican insurance company 
before driving into Mexico. 
However, when possible, protection will be 
afforded for those coverages for which a 
premium is shown on the declarations page 
for an insured auto while that auto is within 
75 miles of the United States border and only 
for a period not to exceed ten days after each 
separate entry into the Republic of Mexico 
If loss or damage occurs which may require 
repair of the insured auto or replacement of 
any part(s) while the auto is in Mexico, the 
basis for adjustment of the claim will be as 
follows any amount payable resulting from 
any loss or damage occurring m the Republic 
of Mexico shall be payable in the United 
States of America We will not be liable for 
more than the cost of having the repairs or 
replacement parts made at the nearest point 
in the United States where the repairs or 
replacements can be made. The costs for 
towing, transportation and salvage 
operations of the auto while within Mexico 
are not covered under this policy 
Changes 
Premium Changes 
The premium for each auto is based on 
information Allstate has received from you 
or other sources. You agree to cooperate with 
us in determining if this information is correct, 
if it is complete, and if it changes during the 
policy period You agree that if this 
information changes or is incorrect or 
incomplete, we may adjust your premium 
accordingly during the policy period 
Changes which result in a premium 
adjustment are contained in our rules. These 
include, but are not limited to* 
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1. autos insured by the policy including 
changes in use. 
2. drivers residing in your household, their 
ages or marital status. 
3. coverages or coverage limits. 
4. rating territory. 
5. discount eligibility. 
Any calculation or adjustment of your 
premium will be made using the rules, rates, 
and forms in effect, and on file if required, for 
our use in your state. 
Coverage Changes 
When Allstate broadens a coverage during 
the policy period without additional charge, 
you have the new feature if you have the 
coverage to which it applies. The new feature 
applies on the date the coverage change is 
effective in your state. Otherwise, the policy 
can be changed only by endorsement. Any 
change in your coverage will be made using 
the rules, rates, and forms in effect, and on 
file if required, for our use in your state. 
Duty To Report Policy Changes 
Your policy was issued in reliance on the 
information you provided concerning autos 
and persons insured by the policy. To properly 
insure your auto, you should promptly 
notify us when you change your address or 
whenever any resident operators insured by 
your policy are added or deleted. 
You must notify us within 30 days when you 
acquire an additional or replacement auto. If 
you don't, coverage will not be afforded 
under this policy. 
Combining Limits Of Two Or More Autos 
Prohibited 
The limits of liability applicable to any one 
auto shown on the declarations page will 
not be combined with or added to the limits 
of liability applicable to any other auto 
shown on the declarations page or covered 
by the policy, even though a separate 
premium is charged for each of those autos, 
regardless of the number of: 
1. vehicles or persons shown on the 
declarations page; 
2. vehicles involved in the accident; 
3. persons seeking damages as a result of 
the accident; or 
4. insured persons from whom damages are 
sought. 
If two or more autos are shown on the 
declarations page and one of these autos is 
involved in the accident, the limits of liability 
shown on the declarations page for the 
involved auto will apply. If none of the autos 
shown on the declarations page is involved in 
a covered accident involving an insured auto, 
the highest limits of liability shown on the 
declarations page for any one auto will 
apply. 
Transfer 
This policy can't be transferred to anyone 
without our written consent. However, if 
you die, coverage will be provided until the 
end of the policy period for: 
1 . your legal representative while acting as 
such, and 




The coverages of this policy and the premium 
shown on the declarations page for these 
coverages have been established in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah 
Insurance Code. If a court of competent 
jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, 
from which there is no appeal, the effect of 
which is to render the provisions of such 
Code invalid or unenforceable in whole or in 
pan, Allstate shall have the right to revise 
the affected coverages afforded by this policy 
Also, Allstate shall have the right to 
recompute the premium payable for this 
policy. 
Payment 
If your payment of the initial premium 
amount due is by check, draft, or any 
remittance other than cash, such payment is 
conditional upon the check, draft, or other 
remittance being honored upon presentation. 
If such check, draft, or remittance is not 
honored upon presentation, this policy shall 
be deemed void from its inception. This 
means that Allstate will not be liable under 
this policy for any claims or damages which 
would otherwise be covered had the check, 
draft, or remittance been honored upon 
presentation. 
Termination 
If we offer to renew your policy and your 
required premium payment isn't received on 
or before the end of the then current policy 
period, your policy will terminate on the 
expiration date of the then current policy 
period. 
Non-Renewal 
If we don't intend to renew your policy, we 
will mail you notice at least 30 days before 
the end of the policy period. 
Fraud or Misrepresentation 
Your policy was issued in reliance on the 
information you provided on your auto 
insurance application concerning autos and 
persons insured by the policy. You agree that 
if your policy was obtained through material 
misrepresentation, fraud or concealment of 
material facts, or if any material 
misrepresentation was made on your auto 
insurance application, Allstate has the right 
to void or rescind your policy. If the policy is 
deemed void from its inception, we will 
return the premium paid. 
Cancellation 
You may cancel this policy by writing us the 
future date you wish to stop coverage. 
Allstate may cancel part or all of this policy 
by mailing notice to you at your last known 
address. If we cancel because you didn't pay 
the premium, the date of cancellation will be 
at least 10 days after the date of mailing. If 
we cancel for any other reason, and the 
notice is mailed to you within the first 59 days 
of the policy period, the date of cancellation 
will be at least 10 days after the date of 
mailing. Otherwise, we will give you 30 days 
notice. 
Proof of mailing the notice will be proof of 
notice. Any refund, if due, will be 
proportional to the time your policy has been 
in effect. Cancellation will be effective even if 
the refund is not made immediately. 
After your policy has been in effect 59 days, 
Allstate won't cancel or reduce your 
coverage during the policy period unless: 




/ou or any other operator who either 
esides in your household or customarily 
>perates the insured auto has had a 
iriver's license suspended or revoked; 
le policy was obtained through material 
^representation; 
)ere is a substantial change in the risk 
>sumed by us; 
ere are substantial breaches of 
ntractual duties, conditions, or 
arranties; or 
Istate has mailed you a notice of 
icellation within the first 59 days. 
Parti 
Automobile Liability Insurance 
Bodily Injury — Coverage AA 
Property Damage — Coverage BB 
Allstate will pay those damages an insured 
person is legally obligated to pay because of: 
1. bodily Injury sustained by any person; 
and 
2. damage to or destruction of property. 
Under these coverages, your policy protects 
an insured person from liability for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or 
use, loading or unloading of an insured auto. 
We will defend an insured person sued as the 
result of a covered auto accident, even if the 
suit is groundless or false. We will choose the 
counsel. We may settle any claim or suit if we 
believe it is proper. We will not defend an 
insured person sued for damages which are 
not covered by this policy. 
Additional Payments Allstate Will Make 
When we defend an insured person under 
this part, we will pay: 
1 • up to $ 50 a day for loss of wages or 
salary if we ask that person to attend 
hearings or trials to defend against a 
bodily injury suit. We won't pay for loss 
of other income. We will pay other 
reasonable expenses incurred at our 
request. 
2. court costs for defense. 
3. interest accruing on damages awarded. 
We will pay this interest only until we 
have paid, offered, or deposited in court 
the amount for which we are liable under 
this policy. We will only pay interest on 
damages not exceeding our limits of 
liability. 
4. premiums on appeal bonds and on bonds 
to release attachments, but not in excess 
of our limit of liability. We aren't required 
to apply for or furnish these bonds. 
We will repay an insured person for: 
1. the cost of any bail bonds required due to 
an accident or traffic law violation 
involving the use of the insured auto. We 
won't pay more than $300 per bond. We 
aren't required to apply for or furnish 
these bonds. 
2. any expense incurred for first aid to 
others at the time of an auto accident 
involving the insured auto. 
Insured Persons 
1. While using your insured auto: 
a) you, 
b) any resident, and 
c) any other person using it with your 
permission. 
2. While using a non-owned auto: 
a) you, and 
b) any resident relative using a private 
passenger auto or utility auto. 
3. Any other person or organization liable 
for the use of an insured auto provided: 
a) the auto is not owned or hired by the 
person or organization, 
b) the use is by an insured person as 
defined under 1. or 2. above, and 
c) we cover only the insured person's 
acts or omissions. 
Insured Autos 
1 . Any auto described on the declarations 
page. This includes the private passenger 
auto or utility auto you replace it with. 
2. An additional private passenger auto or 
utility auto you become the owner of 
during the policy period. This auto will be 
covered if we insure all other private 
passenger autos or utility autos you 
own. You must, however, tell us within 
30 days of acquiring the auto. You must 
pay any additional premium. Coverage 
will not continue after 30 days if we are 
not notified of the additional auto. 
3. A substitute private passenger auto or 
utility auto, not owned by you or a 
resident, being temporarily used with 
the owner's permission while your 
insured auto is being serviced or repaired 
or if your insured auto is stolen or 
destroyed. 
4. A non-owned private passenger auto 
used by you or a resident relative with 
the owner's permission. This auto must 
not be available or furnished for the 
regular use of an insured person. 
5. A trailer while attached to an insured 
auto. The trailer must be designed for use 
with a private passenger auto or utility 
auto. This trailer can't be used for 
business purposes with other than a 
private passenger auto or utility auto. 
Definitions 
1 . "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" -
means the company shown on the 
declarations page of the policy. 
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2. "Auto" — means a land motor vehicle 
with at least four wheels designed for use 
principally upon public roads. 
3. "Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury 
sickness, disease, or death. 
4. "Resident" — means a person who 
physically resides in your household and 
intends to continue residing there. Your 
unmarried dependent children while 
temporarily away from home will be 
considered residents if they intend to 
resume residing in your household. 
5. "Uti l i ty Auto" — means an auto of the 
pick-up body sedan delivery or panel 
truck type. This auto must have a gross 
vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less, 
according to manufacturer's 
specifications. 
6. "You" or "Your" - means the 
policyholder named on the declarations 
page and that policyholder's resident 
spouse. 
Exclusions — What Is not covered 
Allstate will not pay for any damages an 
insured person is legally obligated to pay 
because of: 
1. bodily Injury or property damage arising 
out of the use of your insured auto while 
used to carry persons or property for a 
charge, or any auto you are driving 
while available for hire by the public. This 
exclusion does not apply to 
shared-expense car pools. 
2. bodily Injury or property damage arising 
out of auto business operations such as 
repairing, servicing, testing, washing, 
parking, storing, or selling of autos. 
However, coverage does apply to you, 
resident relatives, partners, or employees 
of the partnership of you or a resident 
relative when using your insured auto. 
3. bodily Injury or property damage arising 
out of the use of a non-owned auto in 
any business or occupation of an insured 
person. However, this exclusion does not 
apply while you, your chauffeur, or 
domestic servant are using a private 
passenger auto or trailer. 
4. bodily Injury to an employee of any 
insured person arising In the course of 
employment. This exclusion does not 
apply to your domestic employee who is 
not required to be covered by a workers 
compensation law or similar law. 
5. bodily Injury to a co-worker injured in 
the course of employment. This exclusion 
does not apply to you. 
6. bodily Injury or property damage which 
may reasonably be expected to result 
from the intentional or criminal acts of an 
insured person or which are in fact 
intended by an insured person. 
7. bodily Injury to any person who is 
related by blood, marriage, or adoption 
to an insured against whom claim is made 
if such person resides in the same 
household as such insured, to the extent 
that the limits of liability for this coverage 
exceed the limits of liability required by 
the Utah Financial Responsibility of Motor 
Vehicle Owners and Operators Act. 
8. damage to or destruction of property an 
insured person owns, transports, is in 
charge of, or rents. However, a private 
residence or a garage rented by that 
person is covered. 
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9. bodily Injury or property damage which 
would also be covered under a nuclear 
energy liability policy issued by Nuclear 
Energy Liability Insurance Association, 
Mutual Atomic Energy Liability 
Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance 
Association of Canada, or any other such 
policy. This applies even if the limits of 
that insurance are exhausted. 
10. bodily Injury or property damage arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, or 
use of a motor vehicle with less than four 
wheels. 
11. bodily Injury or property damage arising 
out of the participation in any 
prearranged or organized racing or speed 
contest or in practice or preparation for 
any contest of this type. 
Ftnanciai Responsibility 
When this policy is certified as proof under 
any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, 
the policy will comply with the provisions of 
that law. 
Limits of Liability 
The limits shown on the declarations page are 
the maximum we will pay for any single 
accident involving an insured auto. The limit 
stated for each person for bodily Injury is our 
total limit of liability for all damages because 
of bodily Injury sustained by one person in 
any single accident involving an insured 
auto, including all damages sustained by 
anyone else as a result of that bodily Injury. 
Subject to the limit for each person, the limit 
stated for each accident is our total limit of 
liability for all damages for bodily Injury 
sustained by two or more persons in any 
single accident involving an insured auto. For 
property damage, the limit stated for each 
accident is our total limit of liability for 
property damage sustained in any single 
accident involving an insured auto. 
The liability limits apply to each insured auto 
as shown on the declarations page. The 
insuring of more than one person or auto 
under this policy will not increase our liability 
limits beyond the amount shown for any one 
auto, even though a separate premium is 
charged for each auto. The limits also won't 
be increased if you have other auto 
insurance policies that apply. 
There will be no duplication of payments 
made under the Bodily Injury Liability and 
Uninsured Motorists Coverages of this policy. 
An auto and attached trailer are considered 
one auto. Also, an auto and a mounted 
camper unit, topper, cap, or canopy are 
considered one auto, 
if There Is Other Insurance 
If an insured person is using a substitute 
private passenger auto or non-owned auto, 
our liability insurance will be excess over 
other collectible insurance. If more than one 
policy applies on a primary basis to an 
accident involving your insured auto, we 
will bear our proportionate share with other 
collectible liability insurance. 
Assistance and Cooperation 
When we ask, an insured person must 
cooperate with us in the investigation, 
settlement, and defense of any claim or 
lawsuit. If we ask, that person must also help 
us obtain payment from anyone who may be 
jointly responsible. 
We can't be obligated if an insured person 
voluntarily takes any action or makes any 
payments other than for covered expenses 
for bail bonds or first aid to others. 
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. ; : on Against Allstate 
No insured person may sue us under this 
coverage unless there is full compliance with 
all the policy terms. 
If liability has been determined by judgment 
after trial or by written agreement among the 
insured, the other person, and us, then 
whoever obtains this judgment or agreement 
against an insured person may sue us up to 
the limits of this policy. However, no one has 
the right to join us in a suit to determine legal 
responsibility. 
?dnkruptcy or Insolvency 
The bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured 
person or that person's estate won't relieve 
us of any obligation. 
lubrogatJon Rights 
When we pay, an insured person's rights of 
recovery from anyone else for damages we 
have paid become ours up to the amount we 
have paid. The insured person must protect 
these rights and help us enforce them. 
Uiditional Interested Parties 
If one or more additional interested parties 
are listed on the declarations, the Automobile 
Liability Insurance coverages of this policy 
will apply to the parties as insureds. 
We will provide 10 days written notice to the 
additional interested party if we cancel or 
make any change to this policy which 
adversely affects that party's interest. Our 
notice will be considered properly given if 
mailed to the address shown on the 
declarations. 
The naming of an additional interested party 
does not increase that party's rights to 
recovery under this policy, nor does it impose 
aa obligation for the payment of premiums 
under this policy 
What To Do In Case Of An Auto Accident 
Or Claim 
If an insured person has an auto accident, we 
must be informed promptly of all details. If an 
insured person is sued as the result of an auto 
accident, we must be informed immediately. 
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Part II 
Personal Injury Protection 
Coverage VA 
fllhtnf will pny tn nr nn hrhalf nf rrn 
Injurgctperson theiojjgwing benefits subject 
tO the \im\t<j fl<j *perif\*fi »n fhP I imitc nf 
Liability provision. Payments will be made 
only when bodily Injury is caused by an 
accident arising from the use of a motor 
vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
! . Medical Expenses 
All rpasnpahte and necessary expenses. 
incurred for necessary medical, surgical, 
X-ray dental, rehabilitation services, 
including prosthetic devices, necessary 
ambulance, hospital, and nursing 
services, and any non-medical remedial 
care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a recognized method of 
healing; however, it does not include 
expenses in excess of those for a 
semiprivate room unless more intensive 
care is medically required. 
2. Work Loss 
Loss of income and loss of earning 
capacity by the Injured person during his 
lifetime from inability to work during a 
period commencing three days after the 
date of the bodily Injury and continuing 
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks. 
If the Injured person's inability to work 
continues for more than a total of two 
consecutive weeks after the date of 
bodily Injury, the three day elimination 
period will not apply. Benefits end upon 
death of the Injured person. 
3. Essential Services 
Reasonable expenses incurred for services 
actually rendered or expenses incurred 
for services that, if he had not been 
injured, the Injured person would have 
customarily performed for his household. 
The allowance will commence three days 
after the date of the bodily injury and 
continue for a maximum of 365 
consecutive days. If the Injured person's 
inability to perform such services 
continues in excess o f ! 4 consecutive 
days after the date of the bodily Injury, 
the three day elimination period will not 
apply Benefits end upon death of the 
injured person. 
4. Funeral Expenses 
Reasonable charges normally incurred for 
funeral, cremation or burial services. 
5. Survivors' Loss 
Compensation on account of the death of 
an Injured person payable to his or her 
heirs. 
Definitions 
1 . "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" -
means the company shown on the 
declarations page of the policy. 
2. "Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
3. "Injured Person" — means: 
(a) you or a resident relative who 
sustains bodily Injury: 
(i) while in, on, getting into or out 
of a motor vehicle; or 
(ii) when struck as a pedestrian by a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) any other person who sustains 
bodily Injury: 
(i) while in, on, getting into or out 
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of the Insured motor vehicle; or 
(ii) when struck as a pedestrian by 
the Insured motor vehicle 
within the state of Utah. 
'Insured Motor Vehicle" — means a 
motor vehicle with respect to which: 
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of 
this policy applies and for which a 
specific premium is charged; and 
(b) you are required to maintain security 
under the provisions of the Utah 
Financial Responsibility of Motor 
Vehicle Owners and Operations Act, 
Title 41 Chapter 12a. 
"Motor Vehicle" — means any vehicle 
which is required to be registered with 
:he Division of Motor Vehicles of the 
Jtah Tax Commission under Title 41,1-19, 
Jtah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
Dut excluding motorcycles, trailers and 
;emi-trailers as enacted by Utah Insurance 
Iode31A-22-302(2). 
'Pedestrian" — means any person not 
n, on, getting into or out of, or riding 
jpon a motor vehicle; excluding, 
lowever, any person riding upon a 
notorcycle or in, on, getting into or out 
)f a trailer or semi-trailer. 
Resident" — means a person who 
Physically resides in your household and 
itends to continue residing there. Your 
nmarried dependent chiidren while 
?mporarily away from home will be 
onsidered residents if they intend to 
?sume residing in your household. 
You" or "Your" — means 
le policyholder named in the 
eclarations page and that policyholder's 
?sident spouse. 
Exclusions — What Is not covered 
This coverage does not apply to bodily 
Injury: 
1. to you or a resident relative while in, on, 
getting into or out of any motor vehicle 
you own which is not an Insured motor 
vehicle. 
2. to any person while operating the 
Insured motor vehicle without the 
expressed or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession 
of the Insured motor vehicle. 
3. to any pedestrian, other than you or a 
resident relative, when struck by an 
owned, but not Insured motor vehicle. 
4. to any pedestrian, other than you or a 
resident relative, through the use of the 
Insured motor vehicle outside of the 
state of Utah. 
5. to any person whose injury is self 
inflicted or is the result of an attempt to 
intentionally injure another person. If the 
injury is self inflicted and that person 
dies, Survivors' Loss benefits will not be 
paid. 
6. to any person while committing a felony. 
7. to any person resulting from the 
radioactive, toxic, explosive or other 
hazardous properties of nuclear 
materials. 
8. to any person due to any act of war, 
insurrection, rebellion, or revolution. 
9. to any person while in, on, getting into or 
out of a motor vehicle while located for 
use as a residence or premises. 
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10. to any person, other than you or a 
resident relative while in, on, getting 
into or out of any motor vehicle 
operated by, but not owned by you. 
Limits of Liability 
The limits of our liability for Personal Injury 
Protection are stated on the declarations 
page. These amounts are the maximum 
Allstate will pay per Injured person for any 
motor vehicle accident, regardless of the 
number of vehicles insured under this or 
other policies. 
1. The maximum amount payable for 
Medical Expenses will not exceed the 
amount shown on the declarations. The 
first $3,000 of medical expenses caused 
by an accident covered by this section can 
be incurred at any time. If the amount 
shown on the declarations page for 
Medical Expenses is greater than $3000, 
any additional Medical Expenses must be 
incurred within three years of the date of 
the accident to be payable. 
2. The maximum amount payable for Work 
Loss is eighty-five percent (85%) of any 
loss of gross income and earning capacity, 
not to exceed $250 per week for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks. 
3. The maximum amount payable for 
Essential Services is $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 consecutive days for an 
Injured person's inability to perform 
services for his or her household. 
4. The maximum amount payable for 
Funeral Expenses shall not exceed 
$1,500. 
5. The amount payable for Survivors' Loss is 
$3,000, and is payable only to the Injured 
person's heirs. 
6. Any amount payable by Allstate for 
Personal Injury Protection benefits will be 
reduced by the amount paid, payable, or 
required to be provided on account of 
such bodily Injury: 
(a) under any workers' compensation 
plan or similar statutory plan; or 
(b) by the United States or any of its 
agencies because of the Injured 
person being on active duty in the 
military services. 
Unreasonable or Unnecessary Medical 
Expenses — \ 
( t f t h e insured person incurs medical expenses \ 
which are unreasonable or unnecessary, we 
may refuse to pay for those medical expenses 
and contest them. Unreasonable medical 
expenses are fees for medical services which 
are substantially higher than the usual and ' 
icustomary charges for those services. J 
Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for \ 
medical services which are not usually and ] 
customarily performed for treatment of the I 
injury, including fees for an excessive numben 
amount, or duration of medical services, r—' I amo 
If the insured person is sued by a medical 
services provider because we refuse to pay 
contested medical expenses, we will pav all 
de££n$£.costs and any resulting judgment 
against the insured person. We willjchoose 
the counsel. The insured person must 
coofifijatfij^vith us in the defense of any claim 
or lawsuit. If we ask the insured person to 
attend hearings or trials, we will pay up to 
$50 per day for loss of wages or salary. We 
will also pay other reasonable expenses 
incurred at our request. 
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DH Against Allstate 1 
ne may sue us under this coverage 1 
,s there is full compliance with all the \ 
/ terms. 
:e To Allstate 
on as possible, the Injured person or 
one on that person's behalf must give us 
?n notice of the accident. This notice 
include the time, place and 
nstances of the accident and the identity 
? injured person. If an Injured person or 
one on that person's behalf sues a third 
to recover damages from anyone" 
fed responsible for the injury a copy of 
immons, complaint or other document 
be sent to us as soon as possible. 
r
 of Claim; Medical Reports 
on as possible, the Injured person or 
one on that person's behalf must give us 
>n proof of claim. It must include all 
s we may need to determine the 
nts payable. We may also require any 
n making claim to submit to questioning 
oath and sign the transcript. 
ijured person may be required to take 
al examinations by physicians we 
e, as often as we reasonably require. 
ust be given authorization to obtain 
a I reports and other records pertinent 
claim. 
;upilcatlon of 8enef\ts; Priority of 
ents; Other Insurance 
lured person shall recover duplicate 
its for the same elements of loss under 
any other similar insurance including 
surance. If two or more insurers or 
surers are liable to pay personal injury 
tion benefits for the same elements of 
le maximum benefit payable shall not 
i the highest limit of any one policy 
providing benefits as required by the 
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle 
Owners and Operators Act. 
Primary personal injury protection coverage 
shall be provided by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle occupied by the injured 
person in use at the time of the accident. 
Excess personal injury protection coverage 
provided by this policy will be afforded 
when: 
(a) the benefits of the primary policy 
have been exhausted; and 
(b) the limits of this policy exceed the 
limits of the policy providing the 
primary coverage. 
When two or more insurers are liable to pay 
personal injury protection benefits on the 
same level of priority, Allstate will not be 
liable for more than the proportion of our 
limit of liability under this coverage to the 
sum of our limit of liability of this coverage 
and that of any other applicable insurance for 
the same element of loss. 
Any personal injury protection benefits 
payable by this policy with respect to bodily 
Injury sustained by an Injured person, while 
in, on, getting into or out of a motor vehicle 
being operated by, but not owned by you, 
shall be excess over any other collectible 
personal injury protection benefits, and any 
other automobile medical payments 
insurance, or any similar insurance. 
Subrogation Rights 
When we pay, an Injured person's rights of 
recovery from anyone else for damages we 
have paid become ours up to the amount we 
have paid. However, our rights of recovery 
only apply if thp Igjuryd person has been 
ful ly rnmppn^ fPd fnf [ftp loss, Jh f Injured 
2 
p e r s o n mi ^T prntt^rt fhPCP righfr inri halp I K 
enforce {hem. 
disbursement and Trust Agreement 
When we pay any person underlhis 
coverage: 
1 • we^re^ptirlPd to repayment nf *mmm^ 
pak±byjjj out of the proceeds of any 
settlement that person, rernvprs from any 
^i^itip^siM? p*rfy °r i™ur»r. w^ 
are not entitled to repayment until after 
the person we have paid under this 
coverage has been compensated for all 
damages which that person is legally 
entitled to recover. 
.2. ail rights of recovery against any legally 
responsible part^or insurer must be 
maintained and preserved for our. 
benefit. 
Our rights under this provision are subject to 
any applicable limitations provided in the 
Utah Insurance Code. 
Assistance and Cooperation 
When we ask, an insured person must 
cooperate with us in the investigation, 
settlement and defense of any claim or 
lawsuit. If we ask, that person must also help 
us obtain payment from anyone else who 
may be jointly responsible. 
r 1 
\ We can't be obligated if an insured person 
| voluntarily takes any action or makes any 
t. payments other than for covered expenses I 
i for first aid to others. \ 
Part III 
Uninsured Motorists Insurance 
Coverage SS 
Section I 
Bodily Injury Caused By Uninsured 
Motorists 
We will pay those damages which an insured 
person Is legally entitled to recover from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle because of bodily Injury sustained by 
an insured person. The bodily Injury must be 
caused by accident and arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle. We will not pay 
any punitive or exemplary damages. 
If an insured person sues a person believed 
responsible for the accident without our 
written consent, we are not bound by any 
resulting judgment 
Insured Persons 
1 . you and any resident relative. 
2. any other person while in, on, getting 
into or out of your insured auto with 
your permission. 
3. any other person who is legally entitled 
to recover because of bodily Injury to 
you, a resident relative, or an occupant 
of your insured auto with your 
permission. 
An insured auto Is: 
1 . an auto described on the declarations 
page to which the bodily injury liability 
coverage of this policy applies. This 
includes the auto you replace it with. 
However, you must notify us within 30 
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days of the replacement auto. You must 
pay any additional premium. Coverage 
will not continue after 30 days if we are 
not notified of the replacement auto. 
an auto you become the owner of 
during the policy period. This additional 
auto will be covered if Allstate insures 
a\l other private passenger autosyou 
own. You must, however, tell us within 
30 days after you acquire the auto. You 
must pay any additional premium. 
Coverage will not continue if we are not 
notified of the additional auto. 
an auto not owned by you or a resident 
relative, if being temporarily used while 
your insured auto is being serviced or 
repaired, or if your insured auto is stolen 
or destroyed. The auto must be used with 
the owner's permission. It can't be 
furnished or available for the regular use 
of you or any resident relative. 
an auto not owned by you or a resident 
relative, if being operated by you with 
the owner's permission. The auto can't 
be furnished or available for the regular 
use of you or any resident relative. 
nsured auto is not an auto made 
(able for public hire by an insured person. 
inlnsured motor vehicle Is: 
»motor vehicle which has no bodily 
njury liability bond or insurance policy in 
'ffect at the time of the accident. 
3. a motor vehicle for which the insurer 
denies coverage, or the insurer becomes 
insolvent. 
4. a hit-and-run motor vehicle which 
causes bodily Injury to an insured 
person. The identity of either the 
operator or owner of the hit-and-run 
vehicle must not be ascertainable. The 
accident must be reported within 24 
hours to the proper authorities. We must 
be notified within 30 days. 
If the hit-and-run motor vehicle causes 
the bodily Injury without physical 
contact with the insured person or the 
vehicle the insured person was 
occupying, then the insured shall show 
the existence of the other motor vehicle 
by clear and convincing evidence, which 
shall consist of more than the insured's 
testimony 
We shall have a right to inspect the 
insured auto or any motor vehicle the 
insured person was occupying at the time 
of the accident. 
An uninsured motor vehicle Is not: 
1. an auto which is insured under Part 1 of 
this policy. 
2. a motor vehicle that is lawfully 
self-insured. 
3. a motor vehicle owned by any state, 
federal or local government or agency. 
4. a motor vehicle or trailer operated on 
rails or crawler-treads. 
motor vehicle covered by a bond or 
isurance policy which doesn't provide at 
?ast the minimum financial security 
?quirements of the state in which your 
isured auto is principally garaged. 
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5. a farm-type tractor or equipment 
designed for use principally off public 
roads, except while actually on public 
roads. 
Exclusions — What Is not covered 
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured 
person is legally entitled to recover because 
of: 
1. bodily Injury to any person who makes a 
settlement without our written consent. 
2. bodily Injury sustained while in, on, 
getting into or out of, or when struck by 
an uninsured motor vehicle which is 
owned by you or a resident relative. 
3. bodily Injury if the payment would 
directly or indirectly benefit any workers' 
compensation or disability benefits 
insurer, including a self-insurer. 
4. bodily Injury while in, on, getting into or 
out of a motor vehicle you own which is 
insured for this coverage under another 
policy. 
5. bodily Injury sustained while in, on, 
getting into or out of, or while operating 
a motor vehicle which is not an insured 
auto but is owned by, furnished or 
available for the regular use of you or a 
resident relative. 
6. any punitive or exemplary damages or 
related defense costs, regardless of any 
other provision of this policy. 
7. bodily Injury arising out of an insured 
person's ownership, maintenance or use 
of a motor vehicle with less than four 
wheels. 
8. bodily Injury arising from the 
participation in any prearranged or 
organized racing or speed contest or in 
practice or preparation for any contest of 
this type. 
Limits of Liability 
The coverage limit shown on the declarations 
page for: 
1. "each person" is the maximum that we 
will pay for damages arising out of bodily 
Injury to one person in any one motor 
vehicle accident, including all damages 
sustained by anyone else as a result of 
that bodily Injury. 
2. "each accident" is the maximum that we 
will pay for damages arising out of bodily 
Injury to two or more persons in any one 
motor vehicle accident. This "each 
accident" limit is subject to the limit for 
"each person." 
These limits are the maximum Allstate will 
pay for any one motor vehicle accident 
regardless of the number of: 
1. claims made; 
2. vehicles or persons shown on the 
declarations page; or 
3. vehicles involved in the accident. 
The Bodily Injury Caused By Uninsured 
Motorists limits apply to each insured auto as 
shown on the declarations page. This means 
the insuring of more than one person or auto 
under this or other auto policies will not 
increase our uninsured motorists limit of 
liability beyond the amount shown for any 
one auto. Coverage on any auto on this 
policy may not be stacked or added upon the 
coverage of any other auto on this policy 
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even though a separate premium is charged 
for each auto. 
Subject to the above limits of liability 
jamages payable will be reduced by: 
3) all amounts paid by or on behalf of the 
owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle or anyone else 
responsible. This includes all sums paid 
under the bodily injury liability coverage 
or property damage liability coverage of 
this or any other auto policy. 
) all amounts payable under any workers' 
compensation law, disability benefits 
law, or similar law, automobile medical 
payments insurance, or any similar 
personal injury protection coverage. 
'e are not obligated to make any payment 
r bodily Injury under this coverage which 
ises out of an accident involving the use of 
i uninsured motor vehicle until after the 
n'ts of liability for all liability protection in 
:ect and applicable at the time of the 
cident have been exhausted by payment of 
jgments or settlements. 
:tion II 
sperty Damage Caused By Uninsured 
jtorlsts 
? will pay those damages that an insured 
son is legally entitled to recover from the 
ner or operator of an uninsured motor 
ilcle because of property damage. The 
perty damage must be caused by 
dent and arise out of the ownership, 
ntenance or use of an uninsured motor 
Icle. We will not pay any punitive or 
nplary damages. 
perty damage is covered only if: 
a separate limit is shown on the 
declarations page for Property Damage 
Caused By Uninsured Motorists; 
b) the accident causing the property 
damage involves actual physical contact 
between the insured auto and an 
uninsured motor vehicle; 
c) the owner, operator, or license plate 
number of the uninsured motor vehicle 
is identified; and 
d) the insured or someone on his behalf 
reports the accident within 10 days to 
Allstate. 
The insured person or other person making 
claim for property damage must allow us to 
inspect any damaged property. 
If an insured person sues a person believed 
responsible for the accident without our 
written consent, we are not bound by any 
resultingjudgment. 
Insured Persons 
1 . you and any resident relative. 
2. any other person who is legally entitled 
to recover because of property damage. 
An Insured auto is: 
1. an auto described on the declarations 
page to which the bodily injury and 
property damage liability coverage of this 
policy applies. This includes the auto you 
replace it with. However, you must notify 
us within 30 days of the replacement 
auto. You must pay any additional 
premium. Coverage will not continue 
after 30 days if we are not notified of the 
replacement auto. 
2. an auto you become the owner of 
during the policy period. This additional 
auto will be covered if Allstate insures 
all other private passenger autos you 
own. You must, however, tell us within 
16 
30 days after you acquire the auto. You 
must pay any additional premium. 
Coverage will not continue if we are not 
notified of the additional auto. 
An insured auto is not an auto made 
available for public hire by an insured person. 
An uninsured motor vehicle Is: 
1 . a motor vehicle which is not covered 
under a liability policy at the time of the 
accident. 
2. a motor vehicle covered by a bond or 
insurance policy which doesn't provide at 
least the minimum financial security 
requirements of the state in which your 
insured auto is principally garaged. 
3. a motor vehicle for which the insurer 
denies coverage, or the insurer becomes 
insolvent. 
4. a hit-and-run motor vehicle which 
causes property damage to the insured 
auto as a result of physical contact 
between the vehicles. We shall have a 
right to inspect the insured auto or any 
motor vehicle the insured person was 
occupying at the time of the accident. 
An uninsured motor vehicle Is not: 
1 . an auto which is insured under Part I of 
this policy. 
2. a motor vehicle that Is lawfully 
self-insured. 
3. a motor vehicle owned by any state, 
federal or local government or agency. 
4. a motor vehicle or trailer operated on 
rails or crawler-treads. 
Exclusions — What \s not covered 
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured 
person is legally entitled to recover because 
of: 
1 . property damage to any insured auto 
when an insured person makes a 
settlement without our written consent. 
2. property damage to any auto you own 
which is not insured for Property 
Damage Caused By Uninsured Motorists 
under this policy. 
3. property damage which is paid or 
payable under any other property 
insurance. 
4. property damage if the payment would 
directly or indirectly benefit any insurer 
of property. 
5. any punitive or exemplary damages or 
related defense costs, regardless of any 
other provision of this policy. 
6. property damage arising out of an 
insured person's ownership, maintenance 
or use of a motor vehicle with less than 
four wheels. 
7. property damage arising from the 
participation in any prearranged or 
organized racing or speed contest or in 
practice or preparation for any contest of 
this type. 
Limits of Liability 
Allstate's limit of liability for Property 
Damage Caused By Uninsured Motorists is 
the lesser of: 
1 . the actual cash value of the insured 
auto; 
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2. the amount necessary to repair or replace 
the insured auto; or 
3. the limit of liability shown on the 
declarations page for the insured auto. 
Subject to the above limit of liability, damages 
payable will be reduced by: 
I. all amounts paid by the owner or 
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle; 
I. any deductible shown on the 
declarations page. 
X/e are not obligated to make any payment 
or property damage under this coverage 
vhich arises out of an accident involving an 
jninsured motor vehicle until after the limits 
)f liability for all liability protection in effect 
md applicable at the time of the accident 
iave been exhausted by payment of 




. "Actual Cash Value" — means the 
current replacement cost of the property 
new reduced by an allowance for 
depreciation. 
. "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" -
means the company shown on the 
declarations page of the policy. 
. "Auto" — means a land motor vehicle 
with at least four wheels designed for use 
principally upon public roads. 
. "Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury, 
sickness, disease or death. 
5. "Depreciation" — means the decrease in 
value of property due to age and 
wear-and-tear. 
6. "Motor Vehicle" — means a land motor 
vehicle or trailer other than 
a) a vehicle or other equipment 
designed for use off public roads, 
while not upon public roads, 
b) a vehicle operated on rails or 
crawler-treads, or 
c) a vehicle while used as a residence or 
premises and not as a motor vehicle. 
7. "Property Damage" — means damage 
to or destruction of the insured auto but 
does not include loss of use to the insured 
auto or damage to personal property 
contained in the insured auto. 
8. "Resident" — means a person who 
physically resides in your household with 
the intention of continuing residence 
there. Your unmarried dependent 
children while temporarily away from 
home will be considered residents if they 
intend to resume residing in your 
household. 
9. "You" or "Your" - means the 
policyholder named on the declarations 
page and that policyholder's resident 
spouse. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits 
No person will recover duplicate benefits for 
the same elements of loss under this or any 
other insurance, including approved plans of 
self-insurance. 
Proof Of Claim; Medical Reports 
As soon as possible, any person making claim 
must give us written proof of claim. It must 
include all details we may need to determine 
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the amounts payable. We may also require 
any person making claim to submit to 
questioning under oath and sign the 
transcript. 
The insured person may be required to take 
medical examinations by physicians we 
choose, as often as we reasonably require. 
We must be given authorization to obtain 
medical reports and copies of records. 
Assistance and Cooperation 
We may require the insured person to take 
proper action to preserve all rights to recover 
damages from anyone responsible. 
Legal Actions 
No one may sue us under this coverage 
unless there is full compliance with all policy 
terms. 
If, at any time before we pay for the loss, an 
insured person institutes a suit against 
anyone believed responsible for the accident, 
we must immediately be given a copy of the 
summons and complaint or other process. If a 
suit is brought without our written consent, 
we aren't bound by any resulting judgment. 
if There Is Other Insurance 
If the insured person was in, on, getting into 
or out of a vehicle which is insured for this 
coverage under another policy, coverage 
under this policy will be excess. This means 
that when the insured person is legally 
entitled to recover damages in excess of the 
other policy limit, we will pay only the 
amount by which the limit of liability of this 
policy exceeds the limit of liability of that 
policy. 
If more than one policy applies to the accident 
on a primary basis, the total benefits payable 
will not exceed the maximum benefits 
payable by the policy with the highest limit 
for uninsured motorists coverage. We will 
bear our proportionate share with other 
uninsured motorists benefits. This applies no 
matter how many autos or auto policies may 
be involved, whether written by Allstate or 
another company. 
Trust Agreement 
When we pay any person under this 
coverage: 
1. we are entitled to repayment of amounts 
paid by us and related collection 
expenses out of the proceeds of any 
settlement or judgment that person 
recovers from any responsible party or 
insurer. 
2. all rights of recovery against any 
responsible parity or insurer must be 
maintained and preserved for our 
benefit. 
3. insured persons, if we ask, must take 
proper action in their name to recover 
damages from any responsible party or 
insurer. We will select the attorney. We 
will pay all related costs and fees. 
We will not ask the insured person to sue the 
insured of an insolvent insurer. 
Payment Of Loss By Allstate 
Any amount due is payable to the insured 
person, to the parent or guardian of an 
injured minor, or to the spouse of any insured 
person who dies. However, we may pay any 
person lawfully entitled to recover damages. 
Subrogation Rights 
When we pay, an insured person's rights of 
recovery from anyone else for damages we 
have paid become ours up to the amount we 
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help us enforce them. 
if We Cannot Agree 
If the insured person and we don't agree on 
that person's right to receive any damages or 
the amount, then upon mutual consent, the 
disagreement will be settled by arbitration. 
Arbitration will take place under the rules of 
the American Arbitration Association. 
If either party objects to the use of the rules of 
the American Arbitration Association, the 
Following alternative method of arbitration 
A/ill be used. The insured person will select 
one arbitrator. We will select another. The 
w o arbitrators will select a third. If they can't 
jgree on a third arbitrator within 30 days, the 
udge of the court of record in the county of 
urisdiction where arbitration is pending will 
ippoint the third arbitrator. The written 
lecision of any two arbitrators will determine 
he issues. The insured person will pay the 
rbitrator that person selects. We will pay the 
>ne we select. The expense of the third 
rbitrator will be shared equally. However, 
ttorney fees and fees paid to medical and 
ther expert witnesses, are not considered 
rbitration expenses. These costs are paid by 
le party incurring them. 
jgardless of the method of arbitration, any 
bitration award will be binding and may be 
itered as a judgment in a proper court. 
Part IV 
Protection Against Loss To The Auto 
The following coverages apply when 
indicated on the declarations page. 
Additional payments, autos insured, 
definitions, exclusions, and other information 
applicable to all these coverages appear 
beginning on page 21. 
COVERAGE DD 
Auto Collision Insurance 
Allstate will pay for direa and accidental loss 
to your insured auto (including insured loss 
to an attached trailer) from a collision with 
another object or by upset of that auto or 
trailer. The deductible amount won't be 
subtracted from the loss payment in collisions 
involving your insured auto and another 
auto insured by us. 
COVERAGE HH 
Auto Comprehensive Insurance 
Allstate will pay for direct and accidental loss 
to your insured auto not caused by collision. 
Coverage includes but is not limited to loss 
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or 
larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, 
hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or 
vandalism, and riot or civil commotion. Glass 
breakage, whether or not caused by collision, 
and collision with a bird or animal is covered. 
Allstate will pay up to $2500 for loss to a 
sound system permanently installed in your 
auto by bolts, brackets, or other means, its 
antennas, or other apparatus in or on your 
auto used specifically with that system. 
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By agreement between you and Allstate, the 
deductible amount will not be subtracted 
from a glass breakage loss if the glass is 
repaired rather than replaced. 
COVERAGE JJ 
Towing and Labor Costs 
Allstate will pay costs for labor done at the 
initial place of disablement of your insured 
auto. We will also pay for towing made 
necessary by the disablement. The total limit 
of our liability for each loss is shown on the 
declarations page. 
COVERAGE UU 
Rental Reimbursement Coverage 
If you have either collision or comprehensive 
coverage under this policy and the loss 
involves either coverage, Allstate will repay 
you for your cost of renting an auto from a 
rental agency or garage. We will not pay 
more than the dollar amount per day shown 
on the declarations page. We won't pay 
mileage charges. 
If your insured auto is stolen, payment for 
transportation expenses will be made under 
the terms of paragraph 3. of "Additional 
Payments Allstate Will Make." However, the 
limits for this coverage will apply if they 
exceed the limits stated under "Additional 
Payments Allstate Will Make." 
If your insured auto is disabled by a collision 
or comprehensive loss, coverage starts the 
day after the loss. If it is drivable, coverage 
starts the day after the auto is taken to the 
garage for repairs. 
Coverage ends when whichever of the 
following occurs first: 
1. if the auto is disabled by a collision or 
comprehensive loss, completion of repairs 
or replacement of the auto; 
2. if the auto is stolen, when we offer 
settlement or your auto is returned to 
use; or 
3. thirty full days of coverage. 
COVERAGE ZA 
Sound System Coverage 
Allstate will pay for loss to a sound system 
permanently installed in your auto by bolts, 
brackets or other means, its antennas or other 
apparatus in or on your auto used 
specifically with that system. 
Coverage ZA applies only if comprehensive 
insurance is in effect under this policy. 
Coverage ZA provides coverage for sound 
systems in excess of the coverage provided 
under comprehensive insurance (Coverage 




Allstate will pay for loss to any tapes or 
similar items used with any auto sound 
systems. Coverage applies to tapes or similar 
items you or a resident relative own that are 
in or on your insured auto at: the time of loss. 
The total limit of our liability for each loss is 
shown on the declarations page. 
This coverage applies only if you have 
comprehensive insurance under this policy. 
Coverage ZZ makes tapes or similar items 
insured property under your comprehensive 
insurance. 
Additional Payments Allstate Wil l Make 
1. Allstate will pay up to $200 for loss of 
clothing and personal luggage, including 
its contents, belonging to you or a 
resident relative while it is in or upon 
your insured auto. This provision does 
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not apply if the insured auto is a 
travel-trailer. 
and salvage charges imposed when your 
insured auto is being transported. 
This coverage applies only when: 
a) the loss is caused by collision and you 
have purchased collision insurance. 
bj the entire auto is stolen, and you 
have purchased comprehensive 
insurance. 
cj physical damage is done to the auto, 
clothing and luggage caused by 
earthquake, explosion, falling 
objects, fire, lightning, or flood and 
you have purchased comprehensive 
insurance. 
2. Allstate will repay you up to $ 10 for the 
cost of transportation from the place of 
theft or disablement of your insured auto 
to your destination, if 
a) the entire auto is stolen and you 
have comprehensive insurance under 
this policy. 
b) the auto is disabled by a collision or 
comprehensive loss, and you have 
the coverage under this policy 
applicable to the loss. 
This provision does not apply if the 
insured auto is a travel-trailer. 
3. If you have comprehensive insurance 
under this policy, Allstate will repay up 
to $ 10 a day but not more than $300 for 
each loss for the cost of transportation 
when the entire auto is stolen. This 
coverage begins 48 hours after you 
report the theft to us, and ends when we 
offer settlement or your auto is returned 
to use. 
4. If you have purchased collision or 
comprehensive insurance under this 
policy, Allstate will pay general average 
Insured Autos 
1. Any auto described on the declarations 
page. This includes the private passenger 
auto or utility auto you replace it with if 
you notify Allstate within 30 days of the 
replacement and pay the additional 
premium. Coverage will not continue 
after 30 days if we are not notified of the 
replacement auto. 
2. An additional private passenger auto or 
utility auto you become the owner of 
during the policy period. The auto will be 
covered if Allstate insures ail other 
private passenger autos or utility autos 
you own. You must, however, tell us 
within 30 days of acquiring the auto. You 
must pay any additional premium. 
Coverage will not continue after 30 days 
if we are not notified of the additional 
auto. 
3. A substitute private passenger auto or 
utility auto, not owned by you or a 
resident, temporarily used with the 
permission of the owner while your 
insured auto is being serviced or 
repaired, or if your insured auto is stolen 
or destroyed. 
4. a non-owned private passenger auto 
used by you or a resident relative with 
the owner's permission. This auto must 
not be available or furnished for the 
regular use of you or any resident. 
5. A trailer while attached to an insured 
auto. This trailer must be designed for use 
with a private passenger auto or utility 
auto. This trailer can't be used for 
business purposes with other than a 
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private passenger auto or utility auto. 
Home, office, store, display, or passenger 
trailers are not covered. Travel-trailers or 
camper units are not covered unless 
described on the declarations page. 
Definitions 
1. "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" -
means the company shown on the 
declarations page of the policy. 
2. "Auto" — means a land motor vehicle 
with at least four wheels designed for use 
principally on public roads. 
3. "Camper Unit" — means a demountable 
unit designed to be used as temporary 
living quarters, including all equipment 
and accessories built into and forming a 
permanent part of the unit. A camper unit 
does not include: 
a) caps, tops or canopies designed for 
use as protection of the cargo area of 
a utility auto; or 
b) radio or television antennas, 
awnings, cabanas, or equipment 
designed to create additional 
off-highway living facilities. 
4. "Resident" — means a person who 
physically resides in your household with 
the intention of continuing residence 
there. Your unmarried dependent 
children while temporarily away from 
home will be considered residents if they 
intend to resume residing in your 
household. 
5. "Sound System" — means any device 
within the insured auto designed for: 
aj voice or video transmission, or for 
voice, video or radar signal reception; 
or 
b) recording or playing back recorded 
material; or 
c) supplying power to cellular or similar 
telephone equipment. 
6. 'Travel-trailer" — means a trailer of the 
house, cabin or camping type equipped 
or used as a living quarters. 
7. "Utility Auto" — means an auto of the 
pick-up body, sedan delivery or panel 
truck type. This auto must have a gross 
vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less, 
according to manufacturer's 
specifications. 
8. "You" or "Your" - means the 
policyholder named on the declarations 
page and that policyholder's resident 
spouse. 
Exclusions — What is not covered 
These coverages don't apply to: 
1. loss which may reasonably be expected 
to result from the intentional or criminal 
acts of you or any resident, or any other 
person using the insured auto with your 
permission or which is in fact intended by 
that person. 
2. any auto used for the transportation of 
people or property for a fee. This 
exclusion does not apply to 
shared-expense car pools. 
3. any damage or loss resulting from any act 
of war, insurrection, rebellion or 
revolution. 
4. loss to any non-owned auto used in auto 
business operations such as repairing, 
servicing, testing, washing, parking, 
storing or selling of autos. 
5. loss due to radioactive contamination. 
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6. damage resulting from wear and tear, 
freezing, mechanical or electrical 
breakdown unless the damage is the 
burning of wires used to connect 
electrical components, or the result of 
other loss covered by this policy 
7. tires unless stolen or damaged by fire, 
malicious mischief or vandalism. 
Coverage is provided if the damage to 
tires occurs at the same time and from the 
same cause as other loss covered by this 
policy. 
8. loss, other than collision, to any sound 
system within your auto including any 
apparatus in or on the auto designed for 
use with that system. 
If you have purchased Coverage HH, this 
exclusion will not apply to any sound 
system up to the limit stated in Coverage 
HH for sound systems. Losses in excess 
of the limit for loss to sound systems 
provided under Coverage HH will be 
covered if you have purchased Coverage 
ZA. 
9. loss to any tapes or similar items, unless 
you have purchased Coverage ZZ under 
this policy. 
10. loss to a camper unit whether or not 
mounted. This exclusion will not apply if 
the camper unit is described on the 
declarations page. 
11. loss to appliances, furniture, equipment 
and accessories that are not built into and 
forming a permanent part of a 
travel-trailer. 
12. loss to your travel-trailer while rented to 
anyone else unless a specific premium is 
shown on the declarations page for the 
rented vehicle. 
13. any loss arising out of the participation in 
any prearranged or organized racing or 
speed contest or in practice or 
preparation for any contest of this type. 
14. loss due to conversion or embezzlement 
by any person who has the vehicle due to 
any rental, lien, or sales agreement. 
Right To Appraisal 
Both you and Allstate have a right to 
demand an appraisal of the loss. Each will 
appoint and pay a qualified appraiser. Other 
appraisal expenses will be shared equally. The 
two appraisers, or a judge of a court of 
record, will choose an umpire. Each appraiser 
will state the actual cash value and the 
amount of loss. If they disagree, they'll submit 
their differences to the umpire. A written 
decision by any two of these three persons 
will determine the amount of the loss. 
Payment Of Loss By Allstate 
Allstate may pay for the loss in money, or 
may repair or replace the damaged or stolen 
property. We may, at any time before the loss 
is paid or the property is replaced, return at 
our own expense any stolen property, either 
to you or at our option to the address shown 
on the declarations page, with payment for 
any resulting damage. We may take all or 
part of the property at the agreed or 
appraised value. We may settle any claim or 
loss either with you or the owner of the 
property. 
Limits Of Liability 
Allstate's limit of liability is the actual cash 
value of the property or damaged part of the 
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property at the time of loss. The actual cash 
value will be reduced by the deductible for 
each coverage as shown on the declarations 
page. However, our liability will not exceed 
what it would cost to repair or replace the 
property or part with other of like kind and 
quality. The limit for loss to any covered trailer 
not described on the declarations page is 
$500. 
An auto and attached trailer are considered 
separate autos, and you must pay the 
deductible, if any, on each. Only one 
deductible will apply to an auto with a 
mounted camper unit. If unmounted, a 
separate deductible will apply to the auto 
and camper unit. 
When more than one coverage is applicable 
to the loss, you may recover under the 
broadest coverage but not both. However, 
Coverage ZA, if purchased, will provide 
coverage in excess of the limit for loss to 
sound systems provided under Coverage 
HH. 
If There Is Other Insurance 
If there is other insurance covering the loss at 
the time of the accident, we will pay only our 
share of any damages. Our share is 
determined by adding the limits of this 
insurance to the limits of all other insurance 
that applies on the same basis and finding the 
percentage of the total that our limits 
represent. 
When this insurance covers a substitute auto 
or non-owned auto, we will pay only after 
all other collectible insurance has been 
exhausted. 
When this insurance covers a replacement 
auto or additional auto, this policy won't 
apply if you have other collectible insurance. 
Action Against Allstate 
No one may sue us under these coverages 
unless there is full compliance with ail the 
policy terms. 
Subrogation Rights 
When we pay, your rights of recovery from 
anyone else for damages we have paid 
become ours up to the amount we have paid. 
You must protect these rights and help us 
enforce them. 
Loss Payable Clause 
If a lienholder is shown on the declarations 
page, we may pay loss under this policy to 
you and to the lienholder as its interest may 
appear. The lienholder's interest will not be 
voided by: 
1. any act or neglect of the owner of the 
auto; or 
2. any change in title or ownership of the 
auto if the lienholder notifies us within 
10 days. 
If you do not pay the premium when due, the 
lienholder must, at our request, pay the 
premium; otherwise we cancel this policy. 
The lienholder must notify us of any known 
increase in hazard. The lienholder must pay, 
at our request, the premium for any increase 
in hazard; otherwise this policy will be void. 
We may cancel this policy according to its 
terms. Cancellation will also be effective with 
respect to the lienholder's interest. We may 
also cancel this clause of the policy. In either 
event, we will provide 10 days notice to the 
lienholder. Our mailing of notice will be proof 
of notice. 
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If you do not submit proof of loss within the 
time specified in this part, the lienholder must 
do so within 60 days. Proof of loss must be 
submitted in the form and manner specified 
below. The lienholder will be subject to 
provisions relating to appraisal, time of 
payment, and bringing suit. 
When we make payment to the lienholder 
for loss under this policy, we will be 
subrogated to the rights of the party we pay, 
to the extent of our payment. When we pay 
a lienholder for a loss for which you are not 
covered, we are entitled to the lienholder's 
right of recovery against you to the extent of 
our payment. We have the option to pay the 
lienholder the entire amount due or which 
will become due on the mortgage or other 
security agreement with interest and receive 
full assignment and transfer of the mortgage 
or security agreement. Our right to 
subrogation will not impair the lienholder's 
right to recover the full amount of its claim. 
What You Must Do If There Is A Loss 
1. As soon as possible, any person making 
claim must give us written proof of loss. It 
must include all details reasonably 
required by us. We have the right to 
inspect the damaged property. We may 
require any person making claim to file 
with us a sworn proof of loss. We may 
also require that person to submit to 
examinations under oath. 
2. Protect the auto from further loss. We 
will pay reasonable expenses to guard 
against further loss. If you don't protect 
the auto, further loss is not covered. 
3. Report all theft losses promptly to the 
police. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF Allstate has caused this policy to be signed by its Secretary and its President at 
Northbrook, Illinois, and if required by state law, this policy shall not be binding unless countersigned on 
the declarations page by an authorized agent of Allstate. 
^ ^ > ^ ^ 
Secretary \ President 
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ORIN PENNINGTON #47121 6-19-93 (LISA) 
This is a new address: 367 W. 4900 S., Washington Terrace, 84405. Phone number: 
476-9174. 
Lorin experienced automobile accident yesterday, 18th of June, about 1:30 P.M. 
Said he was crossing Washington Blvd. at 12th Street and headed East. A car 
in front of him slowed down and he slowed down, the car behind him traveling about 
30mph, struck him in the hind end. He was driving a Nissan pickup truck. It was 
a 1985 Ford Bronco that hit him from the back side. The Bronco was pretty well totalis" 
and his Nissan is surviving the accident rather well. He had a high head rest, he 
said he was knocked forward and back, but because of the headrest, neck certainly 
wasnft whipped as far as it could have been. He was in a seatbelt. Had some 
headache last night. Today has some soreness to his neck, but particularly the 
areas of the left sternocleidomastoid insertion. ROM seems to be complete. Will 
start on some neck flexion exercises. Elected not to do x-ray of neck at this time. 
Suggested ice, heat, rest, will use IBUPROFEN 800mg t.i.d. with food at Harmon's in 
Roy. Not allergic to any medicines. If pain isn't resolving over the weekend, will -
take a set of cervical spine films, but as of now, doubt this will be necessary. K 
;30 OC $8 AHC $15 Accident PRT/dc A$ ~ 
A SS (I 
TANNER MEMORIAL CUNIC, LAYTON. UTAH 
SS# AGE SEX S K 
PHONE CURRENT DATE 
S K - d O R O R « * * OTY STAT* ZIP 
HEAD Of HOUSEHOLD _ ADDRESS 
OCCUPATION OR 
PLACE OF WORK REF.BY PATIENTS DOS 
LORIN PENNINGTON #47121 6-22-93 
Follow up on neck pain. Automobile accident on the 18th of June, 1993. Whiplash 
or acceleration and deceleration injury. Will get him doing more neck and shoulder 
exercises, ice and then heat and muscle relaxant. 
$30 OC $8 AHC PRT/dc 
Addendum G 
Jan P. Malmberg, #4084 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
29 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
'33J.T.I H PR 12 08 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
LORIN PENNINGTON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, j 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC, ] 
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C., ] 
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C., ] 
DR. BRYSON SMITH, ] 
DR. JOAN BALCOME, ] 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, ] 
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
> DR. NATHANIEL M. NORD 
! # " 
i Civil No. 940900042 
I Judge Roger S. Dutson 
\v rf> 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a medical doctor specializing in adult neurology and make this 
affidavit upon personal knowledge and belief. 
2. On September 28, 1993, I met with Mr. Lorin Pennington in relation to 
a motor vehicle accident which occurred on June 18, 1993. 
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3. Mr. Pennington had been referred to me by Allstate Insurance Company 
for an independent medical examination. 
4. On September 28, 1993, I performed an independent medical 
examination of Mr. Pennington. 
5. In accordance with that medical examination, I have prepared a report as 
to my findings dated October 4, 1993. A copy of that report is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1. I also prepared a follow-up report dated October 28, 1993, in response to 
inquiry as to any disability of Mr. Pennington. A copy of that report is also attached 
hereto as Exhibit 2. 
6. My review of the medical reports, medical expenses, medical treatment, 
and in speaking to and personally examining Mr. Pennington, has led me to the 
conclusion that Mr. Pennington sustained no more than a cervical strain as a result of 
the motor vehicle accident on June 18, 1993. After that accident, Mr. Pennington 
generated undue personal concern as to his condition which led to the involvement of 
an excessive number of practitioners. This undue personal concern led to his 
generating some duplicative treatment and expenses which were not necessary. 
7. Appropriate treatment for Mr. Pennington in relationship to the 
automobile accident of June 18, 1993, would have consisted of visits to his primary 
care physician, Dr. Taylor, home exercises, and physical therapy or non-manipulative 
chiropractic treatment for a period of eight weeks and professional evaluation, if not 
improved, after eight weeks. 
8. Further, Mr. Pennington received numerous x-rays in relationship to this 
motor vehicle accident, including x-rays taken on July 1, 1993, at St. Benedict's 
Hospital (which were normal); x-rays taken on July 6, 1993, at the Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic (which were normal); x-rays taken on July 15, 1993, at the Bennett Chiropractic 
Clinic (which were normal except for a mild thoracolumbar scoliosis); and a cervical 
MRI scan taken August 3, 1993, at St. Benedict's Hospital (which was also normal). 
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This further reflects Mr. Pennington's undue solicitation of various providers and 
services. 
9. I have also reviewed the medical services of St. Benedict's Hospital and 
the medical services of Bennett Chiropractic and Burns Chiropractic. Mr. Pennington 
obtained excessive unnecessary treatment when he visited both his chiropractor and 
physical therapist on the same days. 
Further, affiant saith not. 
Dr. Nathaniel Nord ^tz 
Subscribed and sworn to before ma this??'/ day of December, 1994 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Francint R. Brown 
370£tst8o.T«npto#$00 
SftttUte City, Utah M l 11 
My Committor* Expires 
April 26,1987 
STATE OF UTAH 
LJfda^^y^ 
otary Public 
My commission expires: 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following individuals on this ff^^May of December, 1994: 
Daniel L. Wilson Cynthia Campbell 
290 25th Street, Suite 204 2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 Ogden, UT 84401 
Jaryl Rencher Elaine Monson 
P.O. Box 2970 P.O. Box 45835 




Jlalhaniel Jn. JVorJ, Jn.J)., J^.L,. 
JiduSI Jfturclcau 
370 &»/ Jon ft Ttmflt. J mil, 300 
(Jail lak. City. 1/lai 84/1/ 
80t.363.3777 
October 4, 1993 
Mr. Clay G. Hamblen 
Senior Claim Representative 
Allstate Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 9988 
Ogden, UT 84409 
Re: Lorin Pennington 
Claim Number: 6530551446 K15 
Date of Injury: 06/18/93 
Dear Mr. Hamblen: 
I met with Mr. Lorin Pennington on September 28, 1993. 
He is 28 years of age, and reports that on June 18, 1993 he sustained a cervical 
injury as a consequence of a rear-end motor vehicle accident. He was slowing to a 
stop, and moving at approximately 2 mph, he reports, when his vehicle was rear-ended 
at a speed estimated to be 30 mph. Impact rocked him forwards and rearwards, and 
except for him striking his head against the head rest, he struck no portions of the 
interior of the vehicle, and remained seated. His vehicle was a Nissan pickup truck, and 
the vehicle which rear-erjded.hirr^was a F:ord Bronco. Seatbelt and chest restraint were 
being worn. As the accident was being investigated, Mr. Pennington experienced 
nausea and headache. He sought no medical attention that day, although later, in the 
evening, stiffness of the posterior neck region developed, which was more intense the 
following day, and prompted him to be seen at the Tanner Memorial Clinic. 
Dr. Paul R. Taylor was seen at the Tanner Clinic the following day, at which time 
he reported soreness which involved the left sternocleidomastoid muscle in particular, 
with examination of the neck revealing no restriction of range of motion. No other 
examination findings were detailed. No x-rays were taken, and Mr. Pennington was 
advised to apply ice and heat, and take ibuprofen 800 mg three times daily. He returned 
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to Dr. Taylor on June 22nd when symptoms were not improved, and at that time 
exercises and Flexeril were prescribed. 
Mr. Pennington indicated that symptoms continued to intensify, and as a 
consequence, he presented to the Emergency Room of the St. Benedict's Hospital on 
July 1", for evaluation of neck pain and headaches, unaccompanied by other symptoms. 
With the exception of mild tenderness of the cervical paravertebral muscles, physical 
examination was normal. Cervical spine x-rays were obtained which were normal. An 
acute cervical strain was diagnosed for which Anaprox and physical therapy were 
prescribed. 
One week later, on July 6th Mr. Pennington sought chiropractic treatments with 
Dr. David R. Trimble, reporting constant neck pain, intermittent headaches, intermittent 
numbness of the left upper extremity, intermittent low back pain, and constant mid-back 
pain. X-rays of the thoracic and lumbar spine were obtained after examination revealed 
areas of spinal tenderness and mild restriction of cervical and lumbar range of motion. 
Four treatments were received through the date of July 12th, at which time symptoms 
remained unchanged, and Mr. Pennington then transferred care to Dr. Dale J. Bennett 
beginning July 15th. Approximately 20 treatments were received through the date of 
August 12th. Mr. Pennington was placed on a total disability status from August 4th 
through August 18th by a Dr. Steve Taylor. 
On August 3rd Mr. Pennington was seen for neurosurgical consultation by 
Dr. Bryson S. Smith, after he had returned to the St. Benedict's Hospital Emergency 
Department on July 24th for persisting pain and reports of areas of back swelling. 
Examination at that time was performed by Dr. Val Rollins who reported that areas of 
swelling were not evident, while range of motion was "fair". He recommended 
neurosurgical opinion. Physical examination by Dr. Smith revealed cervical paravertebral 
muscle tenderness, trigger points in the left trapezius and rhomboid muscles, reduced 
light touch and pinprick perception in the left upper extremity which extended to the 
shoulder and into the left trunk anteriorly and posteriorly, as well as into the neck and 
maxillary region. Hypesthesia was also reported in portions of the left lower extremity. 
Deep tendon reflexes were symmetrically present, there were no pathologic reflexes, 
strength and gait functions were normal. Dr. Smith diagnosed a probable cervical strain 
with myofascial syndrome, and because of the sensory findings on physical examination 
felt that a cervical MRI scan should be performed to exclude a cord injury. The study 
was accomplished on August 3rd at St. Benedict's Hospital, and was normal. Physical 
therapy at Health Works was recommended, began on August 5th, and concluded on 
August 18th, at which time headache was remitted and only occasional neck pain was 
reported, which was judged to be 1 on a scale of 10 with respect to severity. A self 
3xercise program was being satisfactorily performed by Mr. Pennington at home, which 
/vas to be continued. A follow-up visit was made with Dr. Smith on September 8th, and 
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the improvements noted. He felt that the condition of cervical strain was resolving and 
that no further neurosurgical follow was required. 
Mr. Pennington reports no prior symptoms of similar nature, or prior injuries to 
portions of his vertebral axis. He has not previously received chiropractic care. Past 
medical history otherwise reveals a remote appendectomy, no allergies to medication, 
while review of systems is negative for cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, and 
genitourinary symptoms. 
Current symptoms consist of low intensity dull posterior neck pain which extends 
to the upper dorsal spine, present principally when sitting and hyperextending the head, 
and otherwise not generally present, judged to be 1 on a scale of 10. Episodic mid and 
low backaches occur when driving, on a daily basis, for perhaps one to two hours 
duration. This symptom began approximately one week after the accident and then on 
occasions have been associated with areas of muscular swelling of the back. Exercises 
continue on a daily basis. 
Several days of work were missed immediately after the motor vehicle accident, 
and two weeks upon the recommendation of his chiropractor. Since, Mr. Pennington 
has been working full time as a conveyor belt operator and mechanic. 
Neurologic review reveals no impairments of vision, hearing, strength, 
coordination, and sensation. 
Physical examination revealed blood pressure of 118/76. No tenderness involved 
occipital portions of the skull, cervical spinous processes and paravertebral muscles, as 
well as dorsal and lumbar spinous and paraspinous areas. Muscular spasm was not 
present in the paravertebral muscle regions. There was no evidence of TM joint 
dysfunction. Multiple teeth were missing. The oropharynx was otherwise clear. External 
examination of eyes and ears, including tuning fork examination of hearing was normal. 
No vascular bruit was heard on the right, while a soft, perhaps venous hum, was heard 
on the left. Heart rhythm was regular and no murmur was heard, and a grade 1/6 soft 
systolic ejection murmur was heard intermittently. Lungs were clear to auscultation. The 
abdomen was without palpable organomegaly. Extremity examination revealed no 
deformities of long bones or joints. A 10 cm scar associated with loss of some 
subcutaneous tissue was present in the extensor aspect of the left forearm. Median 
Phalen's and Tinel's signs were absent, and provocative maneuvers for thoracic outlet 
syndrome were negative. Cervical range of motion was measured at 40° left and 50° 
right lateral flexion, 60° forward flexion and extension, 70° left and 80° right rotation. 
Lumbar range of motion was 30° for extension, 60° for true forward flexion, 45° for left 
and right rotation of the thoracolumbar junction, and 25° left and 35° right lateral flexion. 
Straight leg raising was negative bilaterally to 90°. Heel and toe walking were 
accomplished without difficulty. Buttock tone was normal. Cranial nerves and fundi 
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were normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+ in the upper extremities and 2+ to 3+ in 
the lower extremities symmetrically, with Babinski responses absent. Language function 
was normal. Light touch, vibration, and pinprick perception were normally perceived. 
Cortical sensory function was normal. Tremor and ataxia were absent. Extremity and 
muscle tone was normal, and no weakness involved major muscle groups of upper and 
lower extremities, as well as intrinsic hand muscles. Routine gait mechanics were 
normal. 
Cervical spine x-rays dateoKluly 1, 1993^ken_at_SL_Bfinedict's Hospital were 
normal. Dorsal and lumbar spin! x-rays dated^July 6,1993^jtaken at the Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic were normal, with an incidemaflinding of an ectopic ossification 
center off the superior and anterior aspect of L4. Lateral cervical spine x-rays and full 
lenqtb-J^P views of the spine taken at the Bennett Chiropractic Clinic on 
July 15, 1993~\frere normal except for a mild thoracolumbar scoliosis. Cervical MRI scan 
aated-Augtisr^, 1993 performed at St. Benedict's Hospital was normal. 
The available medical evidence indicates that Mr. Pennington sustained no more 
than a cervical strain as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of June 18, 1993, 
following which he generated undue personal concern which led to involvement of an 
excessive number of practitioners being involved. Other than the continuation of a home 
exercise program already established, and follow-ups as needed with his primary care 
physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical follow is indicated. The 
prognosis is excellent, with complete resolution of symptoms a reasonable expectation. 
No activity restrictions are appropriate. 
No permanent partial physical impairment should eventuate. 
Sincerely yours. 
NATHANIEL M. NORD, M.D. 
NMN:pt-kb 
Addendum H 
DAJilU VILSON, $.fi* 
Creston Plaza Bldg. 
230 - ESth Street: 
Ogden, 1 IT 84 ^ ' 
Dr. !nam uaicoiie 
5475 South 500 Eawl 
Ogden, TTI »1M B44" > 
RE: I 'ennington v s . A l l s t a t e insurance "" . • >f iL 
D e a l I ' i I 11 i'-i i 
Allstate Insurance M imp.my hai.. refused In priy inr JLorin 
Pennington's treatment as .i resuJt nf his collision of 6-18-93. 
? lawsuit iiin.s Demi liled (inn ii copy ui tue Complaint and 
Summons •¥) enclosed. In order to imL| represent mv clients 
Interest, the lawsuit alieqes in the itlternati ve that, \ii either 
:he services received I, y Mi . Pennington wi I *•» i easo>nable and 
lecessary, and 1li»re£ore Allstate must pa\ t«. i Lheiif oi (2) the 
services were unreasonable u unnecessary and if Allstate doesn't 
iave tip p \v then Mr. PenningI on is d'so not i equired to pay, * 
>ther words if those bills are to be p. id, it is Allstate thai mi/ .' 
•ay them. ( liavr previously WHMI "ascr. c»n this theory, Tn .tact, 
[r, Pennington is entitled tu Nummary Judgement 1 liar would allow 
im to simply be ieleased from this lawsuit and leave it imiw i 
.llstate and the other heal i h carp providers as to whethei or not, 
ny charges are tu be paid, yuver my experience is that because 
f the co. , i 111 nealth care provide! .3 never pursue the case and 
he insurance company at.11 s away without payinq the bills Thi: 
oesn1! make me ve \ happy and so 1 don't plan to do that in ttir 
ase. Instead, T '.'tond to press this matter to trial. 
1
 t. i: i ,i intent to cause you any (-rouble or 
^convenience. The oiijy reason you are named in the lawsuit is 
lat i a>p require i to represent my client's interests , " ' -
^elusion ol <i i I utinr* nnwevci i in ici i IMI cut ol ih i ? 
A*-! 
Code tH*3 i 
-6119 
April "* 
lawsuit and dismiss you from this case in exchange for your 
agreement to be bound by the court's ruling even though you are not 
a party. In other words, we will agree that if the court finds 
your charges to be reasonable and we collect the money from 
Allstate we will pay the money over to you. But, if the court 
finds that the charges were not reasonable or were not necessary 
and that Allstate doesn't have to pay, you must agree to write off 
those charges with absolutely no adverse effect to my client or his 
credit standing. 
I encourage you to accept this offer. The outcome to you is 
the same whether or not you are a party. This way you avoid the 
inconvenience of being involved in this lawsuit. If you agree with 
this approach, please sign the enclosed agreement and return to me 
in the envelope provided. 
If you don't want to agree to this and instead want to be a 
party to this lawsuit, enclosed for your convenience is/iAcceptance 
of Service. I would appreciate.it if you would sign the Acceptance 
of Service and return it to me in the envelope provided. This will 
avoid the necessity of having to have you served by a sheriff or 
process server. 
An Affidavit concerning the treatment provided is also 
enclosed along with a separate letter explaining that. 
Thank you for your consideration. Please contact me if you 











Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
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Date hr.. DrflePDennett 
0&\n 
Daniel I*. Wilson, #4257 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290-25th Street, Suite /204 
Ogden, Utah 84 401 
Telephone: (801) 621-6119 
IN TIIK SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC, 
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C. 
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C., 
DR. OKYSOH SMITH, 
DR. JOAN BALCOMR, 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, 
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY, 
Defendants. 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 940-900-042 CN 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
Tho uiuloi nicjnnd Dr. Dnln MonnoM:, horoby ruu?opts pervioo of 
Complaint and Summons in thir. mat tor. 
Date Dr. DiH*§z Dennett 
Addendum J 
BRYSON S. SMITH 
Neuros irt i 
425 East 5350 South V-
Ogden, 0 
Telephone: (801) 479-91 19 
v94 
Utah State Bar Association' 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I arm Pennington •' 
Dear Ladies ami i i HIIMIMH 
I am asking your assistance to hel| * < :ininie \\\w f*er thtic nas been a breach of 
ethics on the part of Daniel L. Wilson, an *K\ | ,* tu ,ng <u 290 25th Street, #204, 
Ogden, Utah 84401. If you would kindly n \u w the Mimiu.uv whiel follows, and advise 
me as to the appropriateness of Mr. Wils< i«*t appreciative, 
This situation involves Mr, Lorin I enn* ip*-\ , . . , c who was ii ivolved 
in a motor vehicle accident in mid \W} I h was initially evaluated in an emergency 
room and then referred to my office. 1 saw him on two occasions. On the first office 
visit I ordered an imaging study. By the second office visit the patient's symptoms had 
largely resolved,.such that no further follow up was necessary by me, and he was 
discharged from, my care. 
In January 1994 I was contacted by Mr. Wilson, who introduced himself as Mr. 
Pennington's attorney. He informed pie that payment for all medical services had been 
denied by the insurance company. (JHIe asked my permission to do "whatever was 
necessary" to obtain reimbursement from the insurance company for his client. Mr. 
Wilson explained carefully to me that he did not believe that, any of the medical care 
given by the various providers, including myself, was in any way inappropriate 
Nevertheless, he wanted to name me as a defendant in a suit claiming inappropriate 
care/-He felt that this maneuver might i i lotivate the insurance company to pay the claim. 
Again, he assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient had been 
inappropriate. He offered that, should this go to trial, lie had a friend in Mwn who 
would be willing to,defend me at no chargeQ 
My response was thatT *'f not appreciate bemy, named in a lawsuit, particulaily 
one so contrived. He asked discuss ilns wiin my nvui .nianiry and then advise him 
further. 
Dib 
Utah State Bar Association 
RE: Lorin Pennington 
May 17, 1994 
Page 2 
On January 25, after discussing this with my own attorney, M Shane Smith, I 
returned Mr. Wilson's call. I told him in veiy certain terms that I would not cooperate 
with this scheme, and that 1 did not wish to have my name tarnished in such a fashion. I 
informed him that I had insurance and reimbursement specialists in my office, and that I 
would gladly make the services of those peisonnel available lo him and his client, so that 
this matter, which is not atypical in my business, might be resolved in a more customary 
manner. His response was that the suit had already been filed and that I had no more 
say in the matter. He in fact told me that he wished I would not pursue reimbursement 
from the insurance company for my own services, as that might decrease the chances of 
his successful lawsuit. 
I am not familiar enough with legal statutes to know whether Mr. Wilson's actions 
represent a breach of ethics. However, it seems very unusual, and in my opinion does 
not represent an honest use of the legal system. It will cost me both legal expenses and 
time away from my practice. Furthermore, 1 have ical concerns about the potential 
negative impact on my professional stature in the community. 
Once again, thank you in anticipation for youi advice in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Bryson S. Smith, M.D. 
cc: M. Shane Smith 
Smith & Hannah 
311 South State Street, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BSS/gb 
BRYSON S. SMI 1 H, IVI. 
Neurosurgery 
425 East 5350 South, Sinli? 3!!'> 
Ogden, Utah 84405 
Telepl lone; (801) 479 9119 
I I C M M 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Attorney Discipline 
c/o Pamela Blevins 
645 South 200 East, #205 
Salt .Lak.e City, Utah 841 
Dear Ms, Blevins: 
Thank you for your .correspondence dated July (>, IW4 regarding my complaint 
against Daniel L. Wilson... You enclosed a copy of his Min n> you dated June 29, 1994. 
I would like to respond briefly to his letter 
The overall context of i 
liability of the no-fault insurance policy is * u* • <* ( i v ^m 
roughly half of that amount was paid to various provide i s In ^ . i h a\ * 
approximately $1,400 at issue. The remaining unpaid medical bills total approximately 
$2,300, Obviously, the insurance policy will fall short of the total cost of medical care 
for Mr. Pennington. Therefore, in fairness io tie health as providers who have not 
been paid for their services, the best course oi ^•!« * * * 
efficiently and equitably disburses what fun,1 those providers. 
Mr. Wilson states that his plan i • I , * | y 
bills that are "not his obligation to pay,' As Ma- 'd • —, .-;i--i, it i- nttev IIV 
to communicate medical information to third pa.ty payor - \ understand iln 
medical necessity of the care they are being asked to fund, in my experience, I i 
usually leads to a reasonable resolution of payment issues such as this one. This is a 
common practice, in fact almost tl ic noi in, and physicians are accustomed to providing 
such information in these cases* In a discussion * •• tli Mi , Hal Palmer at Allstate 
Insurance, which I had today, this communication issue aros hm ' ^ rai -)* 
that he requested such medical information from Mr. Pennington 
information would have led to a greater understanding by the insurance company of the 
medical necessity of the treatment rendered <*» K>h v»"*,: n, and miuht ^^n/ Hkely 
0 
TO: Utah State Bar 
July 13, 1994 
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have resulted in a satisfactory resolution of this problem outside the legal arena. Mr. 
Palmer informs me that Allstate insurance never received any such information from Mr. 
Pennington regarding any of the care delivered by the various health care providers. 
Likewise, rather than encourage communication, Mr. Wilson in fact pleaded with me not 
to provide information or communicate in anv way with (he insurance company as it 
might weaken his legal position. 
It appears to me that Mr. Wilson is not interested in facilitating an efficient and 
equitable reimbursement process. In fact, one wonders al his real agenda. Ostensibly, 
he may have some altruistic notion of effecting global insurance reform. After all, in his 
letter to Mr. Smith dated April 14, 1994, he comments that "if the insurance company 
gets away without paying the bills this doesn't make me very happy," and he makes 
repeated reference to the "scope" of the problem. I lowcvcr, his primary agenda, 1 
believe, is self service. In a situation where there are insufficient funds to completely 
reimburse medical costs, he has blocked the customary process for disbursal of those 
funds to the providers. At the same time, he has positioned himself carefully to secure 
an award of attorney fees. He exploits the physicians and the insurance company to his 
benefit. 
Putting Mr. Wilson's simplistic patriotic rhetoric aside, justice includes the concept that 
power and position should not be used maliciously or frivolously to exploit others. I 
certainly agree with our system of justice, and have frequently been a participant, usually 
as an expert witness. I appreciate very much your efforts to maintain the integrity of this 
system. My concern is that Mr. Wilson may have violated that integrity by abusing his 
position as an attorney at law. 
Thank you again for your consideration in this matter. 
Sineeiely, 
Bryson S. Smith, M.D. 
BSS/gb 
Addendum K 
Jan P. Malmberg, #4084 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
29 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC, 
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C., 
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C., 
DR. BRYSON SMITH, 
DR. JOAN BALCOMBE, 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, 
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY, 
Defendants. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, and the 
defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, and based upon the failure of Burns 
Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, Dr. Dale Bennett or Dr. Bryson Smith to appear 
in this lawsuit and answer the complaint herein, it is hereby ordered that the above-
action of Lorin Pennington v. Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, Dr. Dale 
Bennett, Dr. Bryson Smith, is hereby dismissed with prejudice each party to bear their 
own costs. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 940003226 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
DATED this ^ / / p day of August, 
BY TtfEJGtfURT 
Honorablfe/Roger S. Dutson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this day of August, 1995, to the following: 
Daniel L. Wilson 
290 25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, UT 84401 
21pennord2 
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Addendum L 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN PENNINGTON, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 940900042 CN 
: Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE, et al, : 
Defendant. : 
Trial in this matter before Judge Roger S. Dutson commenced on 
February 22, 1996, and continued on several different dates, 
finishing in mid-March, 1996'. The trial was bifurcated to 
separate the issue of liability from the issue of attorneys fees. 
Trial was held on the issue of liability of Allstate Insurance 
Company. After numerous motions, stipulations, and court orders, 
the only parties remaining were Lorin Pennington, Plaintiff, and 
Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant. 
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint in 
the Second District Court for his son-in-law, Lorin Pennington, 
against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), Burns Chiropractic, 
Dr. David R. Trimble, D.C., Dr. Dale Bennett, D. C , Dr. Bryson 
Smith, Dr. Joan Balcombe, St. Benedicts Hospital, and Associates 
in Radiology. The complaint alleged that on June 18, 1993, Lorin 
Pennington was involved in an automobile accident and that 
Pennington1s insurance company, Allstate, had failed to pay the 
required $3,000.00 Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, to 
Plaintiff or to the other named Defendants, (who were medical 
providers) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 31A-22-307 and the 
Page Two 
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Pennington v. Allstate 
940900042 CN 
contract of insurance. Plaintiff claimed the bills were past due 
and prayed for judgment against Allstate, or in the alternative, 
against the medical providers, in the event the services rendered 
were determined by the court as unreasonable and/or unnecessary. 
In summary, the Plaintiff requested this court determine that 
Plaintiff's treatment and expenses were reasonable and necessary 
pursuant to UCA 31A-22-307, for judgment against Allstate for 
unpaid reasonable and necessary medical expenses plus attorneys 
fees and costs because of Allstate's failure to pay under the 
statute and contract of insurance. In the alternative, Plaintiff 
requested judgment against the medical providers he sued for 
unnecessary or unreasonable treatment and charges. Prior to trial 
the medical providers had been dismissed from the case by 
stipulation though the court reserved the right to revisit that 
issue if after factual findings such was determined to be 
justified. 
Defendant asserted, among other things, full accord and 
satisfaction, full payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses, Plaintiff's release of all claims, Plaintiff's 
noncompliance with the PIP statute, breach of the insurance 
contract, as well as a general denial. 
After reviewing the evidence presented during several days of 
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1. The Plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, was injured in an 
automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in Ogden, Utah, suffering 
injury which was an uncomplicated "cervical strain". 
2. Mr. Pennington was not treated for any injuries on the 
date of the accident but went to the Tanner Clinic and was seen by 
Paul R. Taylor, M. D. the next day, Friday, June 19, 1993. 
3. Mr. Pennington complained of soreness of neck though 
examination revealed Plaintiff had full range of motion. Dr. 
Taylor did not feel it necessary to take any X-Rays or administer 
any further tests on that visit but told the Plaintiff to follow a 
treatment plan of flexion exercises, ice, heat and rest and 
Ibuprofen, 800mg, and advised him to report back if the problem was 
not resolved over the following weekend. Dr. Taylor mentioned the 
possibility of X-Rays if problem did not resolve but stated he 
"—doubted this will be necessary." 
4. The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Mr. Pennington went 
back to Dr. Taylor and he prescribed doing more neck and shoulder 
exercises, ice and then heat and a muscle relaxant, Flexeril. 
5. The court finds that the recommendations and treatment 
plan established by Dr.Taylor was a standard and proper treatment 
reasonable for this type cervical strain injury and had his 
recommendation been followed, this injury would have probably been 
resolved as soon, or possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and 
apparently damagingly stressful chiropractic manipulations') as if 
Page Four 
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had he not obtained treatment from numerous other medical 
providers. 
6. The court finds that rather than continue with Dr. Taylor, 
Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop" for other medical providers for the 
purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the 
$3,000.00 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal 
injury claim against the other driver pursuant to UCA 31A-22-309. 
7. The court finds that the further medical treatment 
obtained by Plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was 
not only unnecessary, but some of that treatment was given for 
areas of the body not injured in the accident and certain 
treatment probably increased Plaintiff's pain and was the cause of 
increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above that 
caused by the June 18th accident. 
8. The court finds that Plaintiff obtained the following 
treatment after he decided not to continue with Dr. Paul Taylor's 
reasonable treatment plan: 
a. About one week after last seeing Dr. Taylor, Plaintiff 
appeared at the Emergency Room at St. Benedicts Hospital and saw 
Dr. Joan Balcombe, an emergency physician, who responded to 
Plaintiff's subjective complaints of neck pain and headaches and 
upon physical examination and responses given by Plaintiff, she 
felt there was mild tenderness of cervical muscles and because of 




Pennington v. Allstate 
940900042 CN 
pursuit of the complaint in the Emergency Room setting, X-Rays were 
ordered, and though found to be normal, Anaprox medication and 
physical therapy were prescribed• 
b. Instead of following the Emergency Room Dr. Balcombe's 
treatment recommendations, which were similar to Dr. Taylor's 
previous recommendations, within four days after going to the 
Emergency Room, Plaintiff began an intensive Chiropractic treatment 
plan by his own choice. This chiropractic treatment included 
manipulations. He first saw a Dr. Trimble at Burns Chiropractic 
and started that treatment on about July 6, 1993, and had treatment 
during about 6 of the next 8 days. 
c. Attorney Wilson, his father-in-law, then suggested he 
go to his, Attorney Wilson's, personal Chiropractor and long-time 
acquaintance, a Dr. Bennett, where he first received treatment 
about 10 days after he started chiropractic treatment with Burns 
Clinic. Plaintiff then was treated by Bennett chiropractors on 20 
of the next 30 calendar days. 
d. In the meantime, Plaintiff made another trip to the 
Emergency Room at St. Benedicts and saw Dr. Val Rollins, M.D., who 
found no swelling or other objective symptoms, but because of 
Plaintiffs persistent complaints of pain and the normal X-Ray 
previously taken in the E.R., he was referred by the E.R. doctor to 
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e . Dr* Smith saw P l a i n t i f f and based on P l a i n i t f f f s 
sub jec t ive complaints and treatment h i s t o r y with the normal E.R. 
X-Ray and some new complaints, which, i f they t r u l y ex i s t ed , the 
c o u r t now f i n d s p r o b a b l y we re t h e r e s u l t of u n n e c e s s a r y 
ch i roprac t ic t reatments , Dr. Smith ordered an MRI scan to determine 
i f there was a poss ible spinal cord in jury . 
f. The MRI scan was performed at St . Benedicts Hospital 
on about August 3, 1993, and was normal. Phys ica l Therapy was 
aga in recommended and t h i s t ime P l a i n t i f f d id go t o p h y s i c a l 
therapy six times along -with massage therapy about 3 t imes. Some 
of t h i s time pe r iod P l a i n t i f f was a l so con t inu ing c h i r o p r a c t i c 
t reatment . All treatment was completed by about August 26, 1993, 
and P l a i n t i f f had now achieved h i s goal of exceeding the $3,000. 
cap on medical expenses so he could pursue a claim aga in s t the 
other d r ive r . 
g. From the t ime of i n j u r y in mid-June , 1993, u n t i l 
t reatment was completed about August 26, 1993, P l a i n t i f f saw a t 
l e a s t fou r d i f f e r e n t m e d i c a l d o c t o r s , abou t f i v e d i f f e r e n t 
ch i roprac tors , involved an X-Ray technician and MRI technician and 
a t l e a s t two med ica l d o c t o r s were a p p a r e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e 
reading of those r e s u l t s , two physica l t h e r a p i s t s and a massage 
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9. Normal treatment for an injury such as was sustained by 
Plaintiff is exercise, rest, ice and heat, a pain medication and/or 
muscle relaxant medication, and possibly massage therapy and/or 
physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow. This type injury 
usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks and time is 
probably the most important factor in this healing process. Most 
of the treatment normally recommended by doctors is to help the 
patient feel better during the healing process and does not 
contribute greatly to the rapidity of healing the injury. 
10. Towards the end of July, 1993, Clay Hamblin who worked 
with claims for Allstate observed what he considered to be normal 
physical movement and appearance of Plaintiff in the insurance 
office and because of the extensive claims being filed by 
Plaintiff, he became suspicious of the reasonableness and necessity 
of the treatment Plaintiff had received and after consultation with 
Hal Palmer, his boss, he informed Plaintiff that Allstate was going 
to require an independent medical examination. Attorney Wilson 
subsequently contacted the insurance carrier and was very 
antagonistic towards having the requested examination, including 
the claim that it was too soon for such an examination. Attorney 
Wilson engaged in tactics which made it difficult to obtain a 
medical examination by their own doctor, as requested by Allstate, 
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examination was conducted by Dr. Nathaniel Nord, the doctor 
designated by Allstate. 
11. Dr. Nord conducted an examination of Plaintiff on 
September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment history, for the 
Insurance Company. He found no physical ailments relating to the 
accident of June 18, 1993. He concluded there had been an 
uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved. The 
court is persuaded that the medical examination and testimony of 
Dr. Nord, although hired by Allstate, was objective, professionally 
supported and of substantial value to the court in this case. 
12. The court found that the testimony of Dr. Don Rick 
Wakefield, who was hired by Allstate to perform a 'utilization 
review1, was interesting but not of great value to the court in 
this case. Though very well qualified and trained in the 
utilization review process and other areas, he is not a medical 
doctor. His theories relating to the concept of necessary or 
unnecessary medical treatment and expenses were somewhat helpful, 
but the court did not rely on his testimony to any great extent. 
He was found to be somewhat biased in favor of the insurance 
carrier. 
13. The court finds that the Emergency Room doctors which 
attended Plaintiff, provided treatment in a somewhat different 
manner than a regular doctor in a medical office would, in that 
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doctor and were attempting to insure they did not miss a diagnosis 
and therefore were somewhat more aggressive in ordering X-Rays and 
referring to specialists. Based on the continued return visits to 
the Emergency Room (even though symptoms given by Plaintiff were 
subjective) and his continued complaints of pain, they readily 
ordered an X-Ray and referred to the neurologist, whereas an 
'office1 doctor would not likely order such tests so quickly. It 
was in this manner that the X-Ray and MRI were obtained by 
Plaintiff through the emergency room. The court finds those tests 
were unreasonable and unnecessary in this case and were part of the 
Plaintiff's plan to build up the medical expenses for his ultimate 
benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the other driver. 
13. The physical therapy and massage therapy obtained by 
Plaintiff were relaxing and comforting to Plaintiff, but were not 
necessary medical treatment as it related to resolution of symptoms 
arising from the accident. These types of treatment are often 
prescribed for this type of injury, but again, are not essential to 
a speedy recovery, even though normally paid for by insurance 
carriers. The chiropractic treatment was unnecessary treatment in 
this case. The only treatment the court finds reasonable and 
necessary was that recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, the first doctor 
to treat Plaintiff/ and Plaintiff failed to follow up with that 
doctorfs recommendations. 
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them for unnecessary and unreasonable treatment is not considered 
by the court as estoppel, acquiescence, or agreement that those 
expenses were necessary and reasonable. In this case, it was 
Plaintiff's purpose to deceive the medical providers as well as the 
insurance carrier and just because he was somewhat successful some 
of the time, the insurance carrier should not be punished for 
paying more than they should have, and Plaintiff should be estopped 
from having those medical providers claims against him set aside. 
15. The court has a great deal of concern about the 
motivation of Attorney Wilson, Plaintifffs father-in-law, and 
motivation of Plaintiff in intentionally incurring unnecessary 
medical treatment and engaging in conduct to run up unnecessary 
medical bills and have Allstate pay those bills. The court finds 
this lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith and was an abusive 
use of the courts. The events that support this finding include: 
(a) Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a properly prescribed 
treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, (b) 
Intentional creation of unnecessary medical bills by shopping for 
medical providers and jumping around to numerous medical providers, 
(c) Inclusion among the many medical providers, a Chiropractor who 
happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor and a long 
time acquaintance, (d) Willful exaggeration of symptoms in order to 
make Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was, (e) 
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the $3,000 PIP cap under Utah Law in order to then pursue a 
Personal Injury claim and thereby receive several thousand dollars 
settlement against the other driver, (f) Lack of objective findings 
to support any injury or treatment beyond that originally diagnosed 
and recommended by Dr. Taylor, (g) Failure of the Plaintiff or 
Attorney Wilson to notify Allstate of the filing and settlement of 
the claim against the other driver, as required by the insurance 
contract and attorney ethics, (h) Questionable conduct by Attorney 
Wilson in attempting to obtain releases from medical providers and 
at least implying to those medical providers that he would protect 
their interests as much as they could expect their claims to be 
protected in a lawsuit, even though he was suing those same medical 
providers. The court finds there was an attempt by Attorney Wilson 
to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses 
incurred by Plaintiff, (i) Obstructionist conduct by Attorney 
Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstatefs 
doctor, (j) Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this 
case that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in 
attorneys fees under the PIP statute for bringing this action, 
while he knew or should have known most of the medical expenses and 
treatment were unreasonable. 
The court has reviewed volumes of materials including 
extensive notes taken by the court during several days of trial and 
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intentionally restrained from including details of much of that 
material herein, as the record is clear in support of these 
findings and the attorney drafting orders shall include details 
from the record in support of these findings* The court notes that 
it carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses during their 
testimony and reached conclusions concerning truthfulness and 
untruthfulness. The court finds that although the amounts claimed 
under the PIP statute are relatively small, there are some serious 
collateral issues involved in this case and therefore, subsequent 
to trial the court has given the facts of this case much thought 
and deliberation before preparing these findings. As indicated, 
one issue which has been of great concern has been the conduct of 
Attorney Wilson as well as Plaintiff's misconduct. 
Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed and Defendant Allstate 
is entitled to judgment and costs. Although Dr. Wakefield's 
testimony was somewhat biased in favor of insurance carriers, 
Allstate was required to present as much evidence as it could to 
counter the misconduct of Plaintiff and therefore the costs for Dr. 
Wakefield should be included. Evidence of charges for the experts 
and professionals called by Allstate is accepted by the court as 
reasonable charges and should be included as costs payable by 
Plaintiff. 
The court reserved some issues on motions by Plaintiff and all 




Pennington v. Allstate 
940900042 CN 
Defendant Allstate.is.directed to draft clear and factually 
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ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
et. al. 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(AS TO LIABILITY) 
Civil No, 940900042 
Judge: Roger S. Dutson 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial pursuant to 
notice on February 22, 1996, and continued on several different dates 
until the trial was concluded in mid-March, 1996. The plaintiff, Lorin 
Pennington, was represented by his father-in-law, Daniel L. Wilson, 
The defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, was represented by Jan P. 
Malmberg, After numerous motions, stipulations, and court orders, the 
only parties remaining in the lawsuit at the time of trial were Lorin 
Pennington, plaintiff, and Allstate Insurance Company, defendant. 
Pursuant to stipulation, the trial was bifurcated to separate the issue of 
attorney's fees for the plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
309(5)(d) (1953 as amended) from the issue of liability of Allstate 
Insurance Company. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint in the 
Second District Court for his son-in-law, Lorin Pennington, against 
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David 
R. Trimble, D .C . , Dr. Dale Bennett, D .C . , Dr. Bryson Smith, Dr. 
Joan Balcombe, St. Benedict's Hospital, and Associates in Radiology. 
The complaint alleged that on June 18, 1993, Lorin Pennington was 
involved in an automobile accident and that his insurance company, 
Allstate, had failed to pay the required $3,000 Personal Injury 
Protection (PIP) benefits to plaintiff or to the other named defendants, 
(who were medical providers) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 
and the contract of insurance (indemnity) between Lorin Pennington and 
Allstate. Plaintiff claimed the bills were past due and prayed for 
judgment against Allstate, or in the alternative, against the medical 
providers, in the event the services rendered were determined by the 
court to be unreasonable and/or unnecessary. 
In summary, the plaintiff requested this court determine that 
plaintiff's treatment and expenses were reasonable and necessary 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended) and 
pursuant to the contract between Mr. Pennington and Allstate, and for 
judgment against Allstate for unpaid reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses plus attorney's fees, costs and interest because of AllstateTs 
failure to pay under the statute and contract of insurance. In the 
alternative, plaintiff requested judgment against the medical providers 
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he sued for providing to the plaintiff unnecessary or unreasonable 
treatment and charges. Prior to trial the medical providers had been 
dismissed from the case by Order and Stipulation although the court 
reserved the right to revisit that issue if after factual findings such 
was determined to be justified. 
Allstate initially filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a 
Motion to Appoint a Medical Panel on the basis plaintiff's claim for relief 
was not ripe for decision under contract law, tendered the remaining 
$1,305.41 under the PIP statute and contract with plaintiff to the court 
for decision as to whether any was owing and requested the court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307(2)(d) to appoint a medical 
panel to determine the reasonableness and the necessity of the claimed 
charges and tender the remaining amount either to the providers or 
back to Allstate depending upon the medical panel's decision. The 
court, through the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, denied the Motion to 
Dismiss and dismissed the medical panel idea on the basis the costs of 
such a procedure would probably exceed the amount in controversy. 
Allstate thereafter filed an Answer and asserted, among other 
things, full accord and satisfaction, full payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical expenses, plaintiff's release of all claims, plaintiff's 
noncompliance with the PIP statute, a breach by plaintiff of the 
contract of insurance with Allstate, as well as a general denial. 
This Court reviewed the volumes of evidence produced as well as 
reviewed his extensive notes taken during several days of trial and 
hearings, including all exhibits and evidence and after review of all the 
documents filed by each side, including numerous memorandums. This 
Court also personally and carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses 
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during their testimony and reached conclusions as to their truthfulness 
and untruthfulness. Although the amounts claimed under the PIP 
statute were relatively small, there were serious collateral issues 
involved in this case and therefore, subsequent to trial this Court gave 
the facts of this case much thought and deliberation, especially one 
issue of great concern which had been the conduct of Attorney Dan 
Wilson as well as the plaintiff's misconduct, and this Court, therefore, 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to June 18, 1993, the plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, 
entered into a contract with Allstate Indemnity Company. 
2. Pursuant to that contract of insurance Allstate promised to 
pay Personal Injury Protection (PIP) to Lorin Pennington, regardless of 
fault, the first $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses 
caused by an accident covered under the policy. 
3. Pursuant to that contract and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), the contract between Lorin 
Pennington and Allstate Indemnity Company mandated that Allstate only 
pay Lorin Pennington "the reasonable value of all expenses for 
necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including 
prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person." (Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-
307(1)(a) (1953 as amended). 
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4. ff Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical 
services which are substantially higher than the usual and customary 
charges for those services." 
5. "Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services 
which are not usually and customarily performed for treatment of the 
injury, including fees for an excessive number, amount, or duration of 
medical services." 
6. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company had an affirmative duty 
to Lorin Pennington to not pay unreasonable and unnecessary medical 
expenses. This affirmative duty is to protect Lorin Pennington and to 
preserve those benefits for him as he recovers from his injuries. 
7. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington must send to Allstate a summons, 
complaint or other document relating to a third party claim as soon as 
possible. 
8. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington may be required to take medical 
examinations by physicians Allstate chooses, as often as Allstate 
reasonably requires. 
9. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Mr. Pennington was to cooperate with Allstate in 
the investigation, settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit. If 
Allstate asked, Mr. Pennington must also help Allstate obtain payment 
from anyone else who may be jointly responsible. 
10. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Allstate cannot be obligated if Mr. Pennington 
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voluntarily takes any action or makes any payments other than for 
covered expenses for first aid to others. 
11. The Plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, was injured in an 
automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in Ogden, Utah, suffering injury 
of an uncomplicated "cervical strain". 
12. Mr. Pennington was not treated for any injuries on the date 
of the accident but went to the Tanner Clinic and was seen by Paul R. 
Taylor, M.D. the next day, Friday, June 19, 1993. 
13. Mr. Pennington complained of soreness of neck though 
examination revealed plaintiff had full range of motion. Dr. Taylor did 
not feel it necessary to take any x-rays or administer any further tests 
on that visit but told the plaintiff to follow a treatment plan of flexion 
exercises, ice, heat and rest and Ibuprofen 800mg, and advised him to 
report back if the problem was not resolved over the following 
weekend. Dr. Taylor mentioned the possibility of x-rays if the problem 
did not resolve but stated he ff. . . . doubted this will be necessary." 
14. The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Mr. Pennington went 
back to Dr. Taylor, and he prescribed doing more neck and shoulder 
exercises, ice and heat and a muscle relaxant, Flexeril. 
15. Dr. Nord performed an independent medical examination on 
Lorin Pennington, on September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment 
history, for the insurance company. He found no physical ailments 
relating to the accident of June 18, 1993. He concluded there had been 
an uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved. 
16. Dr. Nord testified that Dr. Taylor's treatment of Lorin 
Pennington was reasonable. 
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17. Dr. Nord would not order x-rays when range of motion is 
not restricted; no visual abnormalities are present; and, in Mr. 
Pennington's case, no reports of symptoms of spinal cord dysfunction 
were present. 
18. Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord graduated from the University of 
Utah in medicine in 1965. From 1965 until 1970, Dr. Nord obtained a 
speciality in neurology. In 1970 to 1971 he spent one year as 
Assistance Chief of Neurology at the Salt Lake Veteran's Administration 
Hospital. Since 1971 Dr. Nord has been in the private practice of 
neurology. He is board certified in neurology by the American Board 
of Psychiatry and Neurology. He has served as a Department Chairman 
of Medicine at Holy Cross Hospital. His practice has been of general 
neurology dealing with adolescence and adults. 
19. The majority of Dr. Nord's practice is involved in seeing 
patients in his office on a continuum basis or patients which have been 
referred for consultation and treatment by other physicians. 
20. The court finds and is persuaded that the medical 
examination and testimony of Dr. Nord, although hired by Allstate, was 
objective, professionally supported and of substantial value to the court 
in this case. 
21. The court further finds that the recommendations and 
treatment plan established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper 
treatment reasonable for this type of cervical strain injury and had Mr. 
Pennington followed Dr. Taylor's recommendation, this injury would 
have probably been resolved as soon, or possibly sooner, (because of 
unnecessary and apparently damaging stressful chiropractic 
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manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous other 
medical providers. 
22. Mr. Pennington, thereafter, does not seek treatment for 
nine days, during whioh timo 4?io continued to work ac a laborer. He 
does not return or consult with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul 
Taylor. 
23. The court finds that rather than continue with Dr. Taylor, 
Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop1 for other medical providers for the 
purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the 
$3,000 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim 
against the other driver pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953 
as amended). 
24. The court finds that the further medical treatment obtained 
by plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was not only 
unnecessary, but some of that treatment was given to areas of the body 
not injured in the accident, and certain treatment probably increased 
plaintiff's pain and was the cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed, 
same was experienced) above that caused by the June 18th accident. 
25. The court finds that plaintiff obtained the following 
treatment after he decided not to continue with Dr. Paul Taylor's 
reasonable treatment plan: 
a. On July 1, 1993, plaintiff appeared at the Emergency 
Room at St. Benedict's Hospital and saw Dr. Joan Balcombe, an 
emergency physician, who responded to plaintiff's subjective complaints 
of neck pain and headaches and upon physical examination and 
responses given by plaintiff, she felt there was mild tenderness of 
cervical muscles and because of his self-reported persistent and 
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continued complaint of pain, coupled with pursuit of the complaint in 
the Emergency Room setting, x-rays were ordered, and though found to 
be normal, Anaprox medication and physical therapy were prescribed. 
b. Dr. Balcombe specifically ordered physical therapy for 
Mr. Pennington. She testified she explained specifically what was 
considered physical therapy. She also told him to recheck with her on 
July 12 to assess improvement. 
c. Although he was told to specifically call the next day 
to arrange for physical therapy, Mr. Pennington did not call the next 
day to arrange for physical therapy; he did not return to see Dr. 
Balcombe on July 12. 
d. Instead of following the Emergency Room Dr. 
BalcombeTs treatment recommendations, which were similar to Dr. 
Taylor's previous recommendations, within four days after going to the 
Emergency Room, plaintiff began an intensive Chiropractic treatment 
plan by his own choice. He first saw a Dr. Trimble at Burns 
Chiropractic and started that treatment on about July 6, 1993, and had 
treatment during about 6 of the next 8 days. 
e. Attorney Dan Wilson, his father-in-law, then 
suggested he go to his, Attorney Wilson's, personal Chiropractor and 
long-time acquaintance, a Dr. Dale Bennett, where he first received 
treatment about 10 days after he started chiropractic treatment with 
Burns Clinic. Plaintiff then was treated by Bennett chiropractors on 20 
of the next 30 calendar days. 
f. No matter what the charge was for the office visits 
and the spinal manipulation and additional manipulations by these 
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chiropractors, none of those charges were medically necessary in that 
they did not lead to a resolution of Mr. Pennington1 s cervical strain. 
g. Dr. Burns and the chiropractors at Bennett Clinic 
were providing manipulative treatment on Mr. Pennington's entire spine, 
hip, and ribs. They were not providing non-manipulative care 
whatsoever. 
h. In the meantime, plaintiff made another trip to the 
Emergency Room at St. Benedicts and saw Dr. Val Rollins, M.D., who 
found no swelling or other objective symptoms, but because of 
plaintiff's self-reported persistent complaints of pain and the normal x-
ray previously taken in the Emergency Room, he was referred by the 
Emergency Room doctor to Dr. Bryson Smith for a neurological 
consultation. 
i . Dr. Bryson Smith saw plaintiff and based on 
plaintiff's subjective complaints and treatment history with the normal 
Emergency Room x-ray and some new complaints, which, if they truly 
existed, the court now finds probably were the result of unnecessary 
chiropractic treatments, Dr. Smith ordered an MRI scan to determine if 
there was a possible spinal cord injury. 
j . The MRI scan was performed at St. Benedicts Hospital 
on about August 3, 1993, and was normal. Physical therapy was again 
recommended and this time plaintiff did go to physical therapy 6 times 
along with massage therapy about 3 times (all of the massage therapy 
occurring on the same day as the physical therapy), During this 
period of time plaintiff was also continuing chiropractic treatment, some 
on the same day as the physical therapy. All treatment was completed 
by about August 26, 1993, and plaintiff had now achieved his goal of 
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exceeding the $3,000 cap on medical expenses so he could pursue a 
claim against the other driver. 
k. From the time of injury in mid-June, 1993, until 
treatment was completed about August 26, 1993, plaintiff saw at least 
four different medical doctors, about five different chiropractors, 
involved an x-ray technician and MRI technician and at least two 
medical doctors were apparently involved in the reading of those 
results, two physical therapists and a massage therapist, for a minimum 
of 12 different medical providers. 
26. Normal treatment for an injury such as was sustained by 
plaintiff is exercise, rest, ice and heat, a pain medication and/or 
muscle relaxant medication, and possibly massage therapy and/or 
physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow. This type of injury 
usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks, and time is probably 
the most important factor in this healing process. Most of the 
treatment normally recommended by doctors is to help the patient feel 
better during the healing process and does not contribute greatly to 
the rapidity of healing the injury. 
27. Clay Hamblen is an experienced claims personnel at Allstate 
who has been trained through various training seminars and through 
handling of hundreds of claims. He has the expertise and ability to 
make visual observation of a claimant with a claimed injury to determine 
if the claimed injury fits with the symptoms of the injury and the 
mechanism of the injury. 
28. On July 30, 1993, Lorin Pennington came to the Ogden 
Allstate Claim Office. He met with Clay Hamblen on that day in the 
lobby. On that day, he claimed to Mr. Hamblen that he had a cervical 
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strain and a back strain. Mr. Hamblen situated himself in such a way 
that Mr. Pennington would have to move in a full range motion to talk 
to Mr. Hamblen and discuss the claim. Mr. Hamblen observed Mr. 
Pennington at that time did not have any guarded movement 
whatsoever. In fact, he determined Mr. Pennington appeared to have a 
full range of motion of the full spine. 
29. Mr. Hamblen at this point in time was very suspicious of 
the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment Mr. Pennington had 
been receiving. Mr. Pennington had gone to numerous providers and 
seemed determined on seeing additional providers. Because of his 
concern he spoke with the Casualty Claim Manager, Hal Palmer, and the 
decision was made that Mr. Pennington should undertake an independent 
medical examination. 
30. Mr. Hamblen indicated to Lorin Pennington that he needed 
to submit to an independent medical examination. Following that 
conversation he received a phone conversation from Mr. Dan Wilson on 
August 13, 1993. Mr. Wilson represented himself as Lorin Pennington's 
attorney and father-in-law. Mr. Wilson was very antagonistic in regard 
to having Mr. Pennington submit to an independent medical examination. 
He stated that it was too soon for an independent medical examination to 
occur, and he refused to have his client submit to it at that time. 
31. Attorney Wilson engaged in tactics which made it difficult to 
obtain a medical examination by their own doctor, as requested by 
Allstate, though ultimately, towards the end of September, 1993, an 
examination was conduced by Dr. Nathaniel Nord, the doctor designated 
by Allstate. 
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32. Dr. Don Rick Wakefield performed a utilization review of the 
treatment received by the various providers of Lorin Pennington. He 
was qualified by this court as an expert in utilization reviews and in 
chiropractic care. 
33. Dr. Wakefield is qualified to perform utilization reviews and 
as a chiropractor. He received a Physician Associate degree from the 
University of Florida. He then was selected to attend Yale University 
School of Medicine in a P.A. Surgical Residency Program (equivalent to 
a Masters degree). He later obtained a Chiropractor degree from Life 
Chiropractic College and has also graduated from John Marshal Law 
School. 
34. Dr. Wakefield has held many faculty positions. He was a 
Clinical Instructor at Yale University as well as the Clinical Coordinator 
of the Physician Assistant's program at Yale University School of 
Medicine/Norwalk Hospital P.A. Residency program. He was also in 
clinical practice from 1977 to 1981 while at Yale University. Dr. 
Wakefield has also taught at Emory University (as well as being on the 
admissions committee), in the Physician Assistance Program. He has 
held instructor faculty positions at George Washington Medical School 
and Hanaman Medical School in Pennsylvania. 
35. In the chiropractic arena, he was a full time Associate 
Professor from 1983 to 1989. Since 1985 to the present he serves on 
the Life Chiropractic College, Post Graduate Education Faculty. Dr. 
Wakefield personally had a clinical chiropractic practice from 1984 
through 1989. 
36. Since 1984, Dr. Wakefield has been the Medical Director of 
International Healthcare Consultants. He is certified in all states which 
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require certification to perform utilization reviews and also performs 
utilization reviews across the United States in other states which do not 
officially have a certification requirement 
37. The court finds Dr. Wakefield very well qualified and 
trained in the utilization review process and other areas, However, he 
is not a medical doctor. His theories relating to the concept of 
necessary or unnecessary medical treatment and expenses were 
somewhat helpful, but the court did not rely on his testimony to any 
great extent. He was found to be somewhat biased in favor of the 
insurance carrier. 
38. The court finds that the Emergency Room doctors which 
attended plaintiff, provided treatment in a somewhat different manner 
than a regular doctor in a medical office would, in that they do not 
have the continuity with the patient as does a regular doctor and were 
attempting to insure they did not miss a diagnosis and therefore were 
somewhat more aggressive in ordering x-rays and referring to 
specialists. Based on the continued return visits to the Emergency 
Room (even though symptoms given by plaintiff were subjective) and 
his continued complaints of pain, they readily ordered an x-ray and 
referred to the neurologist, whereas an foffice' doctor would not likely 
order such tests so quickly. It was in this manner that the x-ray and 
MRI were obtained by plaintiff through the Emergency Room. The 
court finds those tests were unreasonable and unnecessary in this case 
and were part of the Plaintiff's plan to build up the medical expenses 
for his ultimate benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the 
other driver. 
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39. The physical therapy and massage therapy obtained by 
plaintiff were relaxing and comforting to plaintiff, but were not 
necessary medical treatment as it related to resolution of symptoms 
arising from the accident. These types of treatment are often 
prescribed for this type of injury, but again, are not essential to a 
speedy recovery, even though normally paid for by insurance carriers. 
The chiropractic treatment was unnecessary treatment in this case. 
The only treatment the court finds reasonable and necessary was that 
recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, the first doctor to treat plaintiff, and 
plaintiff failed to follow up with that doctor's recommendations. 
40. The court finds the fact that Allstate paid several claims 
submitted to them for unnecessary and unreasonable treatment is not 
considered by the court as estoppel, acquiescence, or agreement that 
those expenses were necessary and reasonable. 
41. The court finds in this case, it was plaintiff's purpose to 
deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance carrier and just 
because he was somewhat successful some of the time, the insurance 
carrier should not be punished for paying more than they should have, 
and the court finds plaintiff should be estopped from having those 
medical providers claims against him set aside. 
42. On or about February 19, 1994, Mr. Wilson for and on 
behalf of the plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint against Brad 
Beasley for the injuries Mr. Pennington allegedly received on June 18, 
1993. 
43. No copy of this complaint was ever sent to Allstate 
Insurance Company. 
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44. On March 17, 1994, plaintiff entered into a release with 
Jane Beasley, Pharol Beasley, and Bradley Beasley releasing any and 
all persons or corporations from any and all claims, damages, actions, 
causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever on account 
of injuries Mr. Pennington received in the automobile accident of June 
18, 1993. The release expressly indicated the release was a full and 
final compromise and settlement of any and all claims disputed or 
otherwise on account of injuries and damage above mentioned. 
45. A copy of the release and notice of the settlement was 
never sent to Allstate Insurance Company. 
46. The court has a great deal of concern about the motivation 
of Attorney Wilson, plaintiff's father-in-law, anQmotivation of plaintiff in 
intentionally incurring unnecessary medical treatment and engaging in 
conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and have Allstate pay those 
bills. The court finds this lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith 
and was an abusive use of the courts. The events that support this 
finding include: (a) Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a properly 
prescribed treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, (b) 
Intentional creation of unnecessary medical bills by shopping for medical 
providers and jumping around to numerous medical providers, (c) 
Inclusion among the many medical providers, a Chiropractor who 
happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor and a long time 
acquaintance, (d) Willful exaggeration of symptoms in order to make 
Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was, (e) Intentionally 
'creating' medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the $3,000 PIP cap 
under Utah Law in order to then pursue a Personal Injury claim and 
thereby receiving a several thousand dollar's settlement against the 
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other driver, (f) Lack of objective findings to support any injury or 
treatment beyond that originally diagnosed and recommended by Dr. 
Taylor, (g) Failure of the plaintiff or Attorney Wilson to notify 
Allstate of the filing and settlement of the claim against the other 
driver, as required by the insurance contract and attorney ethics, (h) 
Questionable conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting to obtain releases 
from medical providers and at least implying to those medical providers 
that he would protect their interests as much as they could expect their 
claims to be protected in a lawsuit, even though he was suing those 
same medical providers* The court finds there was an attempt by 
Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable 
expenses incurred by plaintiff, (i) Obstructionist conduct by Attorney 
Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstate's doctor, (j) 
Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this case that he was 
entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees under the PIP 
statute for bringing this action, while he knew or should have known 
most of the medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable. 
[1] Some specific examples of Mr. Wilson's conduct include that 
on February 3, 1994, Dan Wilson wrote a letter to Hal Palmer indicating 
that Allstate was required to pay the addition $1305.41 or else he would 
bring suit for and on behalf of Lorin Pennington under Utah Code 
Annotated 31A-22-309 (5) (d) . He threatened Mr. Palmer that if Allstate 
refused to pay this addition amount which Allstate had deemed was 
unreasonable and unnecessary, pursuant to the statute if he recovered 
$1, he, being Dan Wilson, would be entitled to full payment of 
attorney's fees and costs. 
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[2] Rather than structuring the suit against Allstate in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated 31A-22-309 (5) (d) , Mr. Wilson for 
and on behalf of Lorin Pennington sued Allstate and all health care 
providers which had not been paid. Pursuant to that law suit, Lorin 
Pennington, by and through his attorney Dan Wilson, sent letters, 
dismissal agreements, and acceptance of service to each one of the 
named defendants (but not his own insurance company, Allstate). 
[3] In the letters to each of the health care providers, Mr. 
Wilson acting as an agent of his client, merely indicated the law suit 
against them was in reality a sham in that he was personally going 
against Allstate Insurance Company for the attorney's fees and costs 
and not against the medical providers. He stated to these medical 
providers that he recognized the dispute was, in reality, between the 
health care providers and Allstate Insurance Company. However, Mr. 
Wilson stated that he was intending on pursuing this law suit against 
Allstate Insurance Company. He stated: "However my experience is 
that because of the cost, the health care providers never pursue the 
case and the insurance company gets away without paying the bills. 
This doesn't make me very happy so I don't plan to do that in this 
case. Instead I plan to press this matter to trial." 
[4] Rather than having a law suit as provided by statute 
between the plaintiff and his insurance company, Mr. Wilson attempted 
to enter into an agreement with the health care providers that if the 
court deemed the charges were reasonable and necessary, he would 
collect the money from Allstate and pay the money over to the health 
care providers (even though more money was owing to the health care 
providers that the remaining PIP benefits). In exchange, if the health 
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care provider would sign the dismissal agreement and acceptance of 
service, and the court determined that the charges were not reasonable 
or not necessary, the health care provider would not pursue Mr, 
Pennington. 
[5] Mr, Wilson failed to mention to the health care providers in 
the dismissal agreement sufficient funds were not left under the 
remaining policy PIP benefits under Mr. Pennington's policy to pay each 
defendant if the court determined the charges were reasonable and 
necessary. 
[6] Mr. Wilson went even further than sending the letters and 
dismissal agreements to the health care providers. He contacted 
specifically Dr. Bryson S. Smith and informed him that Allstate had 
determined that his treatment was not medically necessary in regard to 
the injuries Mr. Pennington had sustained (although he did not inform 
him of all the various health care providers that have been seen prior 
to him). Dr. Smith testified: "He asked my permission to do "whatever 
was necessary" to obtain reimbursement from the insurance company for 
his client. Mr. Wilson explained carefully to me that he did not believe 
that any of the medical care given by the various providers including 
myself, was in any way inappropriate. Nevertheless, he wanted to 
name me as a defendant in the suit claiming inappropriate care. He felt 
this maneuver might motivate the insurance company to pay the claim. 
Again, he assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient 
had been inappropriate. He offered that, should this go to trial, he 
had a friend in town who would be willing to defend me at no charge." 
[7] Mr. Wilson had informed Mr. Hamblen that Lorin Pennington 
had seen too many health care providers; he thereafter informed the 
health care providers that he felt their services were reasonable and 
necessary but failed to inform them they would not receive full payment 
if the court deemed all the medical expenses were reasonable and 
necessary; he went even further to^ymditate hp was suing these 
defendants inappropriately* on the basis he wanted to get at the 
insurance company for not paying the $1305.41 in PIP benefits which 
had been denied because the services were not reasonable and not 
necessary. He even offered so far as to provide an attorney to the 
other defendants free of charge, ^to fight his, Lorin Pennington!s own 
insurance company. 
[8] At the time this matter went to trial, Mr. Pennington was 
not obligated to pay any healthcare provider. The only purpose for 
the lawsuit was for Mr. Wilson to attempt to collect attorney's fees and 
costs on this matter. When Mr. Pennington was asked as to what relief 
he expected to get from the lawsuit, he indicated that all he expected 
was for Allstate to pay their part of the deal and affirmatively stated 
that there is really nothing under the deal for which Allstate could be 
responsible. He also affirmed that in June of 1993, he had certain 
obligations under his insurance contract with Allstate which he was 
required to perform. 
BASED upon the aforegoing Findings of Fact, this Court hereby 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On June 18, 1993, Lorin Pennington was involved in an 
automobile accident where he sustained a simple cervical strain injury. 
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2. The court concludes that on that date, the plaintiff had a 
valid insurance contract with Allstate Indemnity Company. 
3. Pursuant to that contract of insurance Allstate promised to 
pay Personal Injury Protection (PIP) to Lorin Pennington, regardless of 
fault, the first $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses 
caused by an accident covered under the policy. 
4. Pursuant to that contract and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), the contract between Lorin 
Pennington and Allstate Indemnity Company mandated that Allstate only 
pay Lorin Pennington "the reasonable value of all expenses for 
necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including 
prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person." 
5. "Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical 
services which are substantially higher than the usual and customary 
charges for those services." 
6. "Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services 
which are not usually and customarily performed for treatment of the 
injury, including fees for an excessive number, amount, or duration of 
medical services." 
7. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington must send to Allstate a summons, 
complaint or other document relating to a third party claim as soon as 
possible. Plaintiff sued Brad Beasley, the driver of the car which 
struck his vehicle, and never informed Allstate of the lawsuit as 
required by contract. Plaintiff further never informed Allstate of the 
settlement of the lawsuit with the third party. 
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8. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington may be required to take medical 
examinations by physicians Allstate chooses, as often as Allstate 
reasonably requires. The court concludes Attorney Wilson engaged in 
obstructionist conduct to avoid or delay the medical examination by 
Allstate's doctor. 
9. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Mr. Pennington was to cooperate with Allstate in 
the investigation, settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit. If 
Allstate asked, Mr. Pennington must also help Allstate obtain payment 
from anyone else who may be jointly responsible. Plaintiff failed to 
even inform Allstate by written notice of the time, place and 
circumstances of the accident thereby extinguishing Allstate's ability to 
fully investigate the accident and the treatment being received by Mr. 
Pennington. 
10. Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate 
Insurance Company, Allstate cannot be obligated if Mr. Pennington 
voluntarily takes any action or makes any payments other than for 
covered expenses. 
11. The court concludes that the expenses charged by Dr. 
Taylor were appropriate, and the recommendations and treatment plan 
established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper treatment plan 
reasonable for this type of cervical strain injury and had his 
recommendation been followed, this injury would have probably been 
resolved as soon, or sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently 
damagingly stressful chiropractic manipulations) as if he had not 
obtained treatment from numerous other medical providers. 
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12. The court concludes that the normal treatment for Mr, 
Penningtonfs injury would have been exercise, rest, ice and heat, a 
pain medication and/or muscle relaxant medication, and possibly massage 
therapy and/or physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow. 
13. The court specifically concludes that this type of injury 
usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks, and time is probably 
the most important factor in this healing process. 
14. The court further concludes that the further medical 
treatment obtained by plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. 
Taylor, was not only unreasonable and unnecessary, but some of that 
treatment was given for areas of the body not injured in the accident, 
and certain treatment probably increased plaintiff's pain and was the 
cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above 
that caused by the June 18th accident. 
15. Dr. Nord performed an independent medical examination on 
Lorin Pennington, on September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment 
history, for the insurance company. He found no physical ailments 
relating to the accident of June 18, 1993. He concluded there had been 
an uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved 
16. Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord is a qualified expert to testify 
concerning neurology having over 25 years of experience in neurology. 
This court concludes his medical examination and testimony, although 
hired by Allstate, was objective, and professionally supported 
17. Dr. Nord testified that Dr. Taylor's treatment of Lorin 
Pennington was reasonable. 
18. The court concludes that rather than continue with Dr. 
Taylor, Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop1 for other medical providers for 
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the purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the 
$3,000 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim 
against the other driver pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953 
as amended). 
19. From the time of injury in mid-June, 1993, until treatment 
was completed about August 26, 1993, plaintiff saw at least four 
different medical doctors, about five different chiropractors, had x-rays 
taken which involved an x-ray technician and had a MRI performed 
which involved a MRI technician and at least two medical doctors were 
apparently involved in the reading of those results, two physical 
therapists and a massage therapist, for a minimum of 12 different 
medical providers. With the exception of the medical treatment obtained 
by the plaintiff from Dr. Paul Taylor, the treatment, x-rays, and MRI, 
received from these additional health care providers was unreasonable 
and unnecessary treatment received by the plaintiff (which may have 
caused increased discomfort and harm and included treatment unrelated 
to the cervical strain) by which the plaintiff incurred unnecessary 
medical expenses. 
20. This court concludes that because Allstate paid several 
claims submitted to it for unnecessary and unreasonable treatment, 
those payments are not considered by the court as estoppel, 
acquiescence, or agreement that those expenses were necessary and 
reasonable. 
21. The court further concludes that in this case, plaintiff's 
purpose was to deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance 
carrier and just because he was somewhat successful some of the time, 
Allstate will not be punished for paying more than they should have. 
22. Further, the court concludes plaintiff is estopped from 
having those medical providers claims against him set aside. 
23. Lorin Pennington had a contract of insurance with Allstate 
Insurance Company. Lorin Pennington breached his contract and filed 
this lawsuit with a lack of good faith, and because of his breach of 
duty of good faith and fair dealing which he has towards his insurance 
company, his claims should be dismissed, and defendant Allstate should 
be entitled to judgment and costs. 
24. This Court also has a great deal of concern about the 
motivation of Attorney Wilson, plaintiff's father-in-law, and motivation 
of plaintiff in intentionally incurring unnecessary medical treatment and 
engaging in conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and have 
Allstate pay those bills. This Court finds that Attorney Wilson and 
plaintiff filed this lawsuit with a lack of good faith and the filing of 
this lawsuit was an abusive use of the courts. 
25. The court concludes the evidence that plaintiff and his 
attorney filed this lawsuit with a lack of good faith and as an abusive 
use of the courts is supported in brief by the following findings (and 
others as set forth above): (a) Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a 
properly prescribed treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul 
Taylor, (b) Intentional creation of unnecessary medical bills by 
shopping for medical providers and jumping around to numerous medical 
providers, (c) Inclusion among the many medical providers, a 
Chiropractor who happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor 
and a long time acquaintance, (d) Willful exaggeration of symptoms in 
order to make Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was, (e) 
Intentionally 'creating1 medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the 
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$3,000 PIP cap under Utah Law in order to then pursue a Personal 
Injury claim and thereby receiving a several thousand dollar fs 
settlement against the other driver, (f) Lack of objective findings to 
support any injury or treatment beyond that originally diagnosed and 
recommended by Dr. Taylor, (g) Failure of the plaintiff or Attorney 
Wilson to notify Allstate of the filing and settlement of the claim against 
the other driver, as required by the insurance contract and attorney 
ethics, (h) Questionable conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting to 
obtain releases from medical providers and at least implying to those 
medical providers that he would protect their interests as much as they 
could expect their claims to be protected in a lawsuit, even though he 
was suing those same medical providers. The court finds there was an 
attempt by Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and 
unreasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff, (i) Obstructionist conduct 
by Attorney Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstate!s 
doctor, (j) Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this case 
that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees 
under the PIP statute for bringing this action, while he knew or should 
have known most of the medical expenses and treatment were 
unreasonable. 
Accordingly, based upon this Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, plaintiff's claims should be dismissed and Allstate 
entitled to judgment and Order of Dismissal with prejudice and costs. 
Evidence of charges for the experts and professionals called by Allstate 
is accepted by this Court as reasonable charges and should be included 
as costs payable by plaintiff. 
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This court reserved some issues on motions by plaintiff and all 
those issues are herewith resolved by these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Judgment herein. 
DATED this ^ ^ c f a y of D^&combcp^l99y. 
BY TH 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Aoting District Court Judge 
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This action came on for trial before the above entitled Honorable Roger S. Dutson, 
District Judge of the above entitled court on February 22, 1996, and continued on several 
different dates, finishing mid-March, 1996. Trial was held on the issue of Allstate Insurance 
Company's liability to the plaintiff based upon Allstate's decision to not pay to their insured 
plaintiff or his medical providers a remaining amount available of $1,305.41 under the PIP 
statute for treatment Plaintiff had obtained after an automobile accident. The plaintiff also sued 
the medical providers, asserting their treatment was unreasonable and expenses unnecessary. 
The plaintiff requested the court to determine if the plaintiffs treatment and expenses were 
reasonable and necessary pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-307 (1953 as 
amended) and pursuant to the contract between Mr. Pennington and Allstate. The plaintiff 
prayed for judgment against Allstate for the unpaid reasonable or necessary expenses plus 
attorney's fees, costs, and interest because of Allstate's failure to pay under this statute and 
contract of insurance. In the alternative, the plaintiff asked for a judgment against the medical 
providers who treated him, alleging the treatment was unreasonable or the charges unnecessary. 
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The issue of attorney fees was bifurcated prior to trial. Subsequent to trial, Defendant Allstate 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorneys fees, and after reviewing said motion and 
Plaintiffs response thereto, the court is awarding attorneys fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 and 
believes UCA 78-27-56.5 may apply as well. 
Prior to the trial on this matter, the medical providers had been dismissed from the case 
by order and stipulation, though shortly after that was done, Plaintiff objected to the dismissal, 
claiming a substitute attorney from Plaintiff attorneys office should not have entered that 
stipulation, and the court reserved the right to revisit that issue if or after factual findings 
determined such to be justified. 
The court having reviewed the volumes of evidence produced, his extensive personal 
notes taken during several days of trials and hearings, all exhibits in evidence, documents filed 
by each side, including numerous memorandum, and having carefully observed the demeanor 
of witnesses during the testimony and having reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and 
untruthfulness of these witnesses, has entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The 
court has noted that although the amounts claimed under the PIP statute were relatively small, 
there were serious collateral issues involved in the case, including large claimed amounts for 
attorneys fees, the conduct of attorney Dan Wilson and the plaintiffs misconduct. The court 
is also concerned that although the court deliberated extensively in this case, because of it's 
complexity, it rendered it's Memorandum Decision on May 31, 1996, that substantial delays 
thereafter have been occasioned by Defendant's attorney. The court is aware that Attorney 
Malmberg has been in poor health, but there may still remain some issues to be resolved and 
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if Attorney Malmberg is unable to speedily respond to all matters requiring her response, she 
is directed to immediately notify her client or otherwise have substitute counsel respond in a 
timely manner. 
Therefore, the court being fully advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
All Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Allstate are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and 
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Allstate, including costs. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that because of Plaintiff 
Pennington's misconduct in bringing this spurious action, without merit and not in good faith, 
Defendant Allstate Insurance is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff for attorney's fees in the 
amount of $15,000.00, which the court finds to be a reasonable amount for defending this 
action. The amount claimed is substantially reduced from the amount claimed by Defendant 
Allstate, as the court believes excessive time was spent by Attorney for Defendant Allstate on 
this matter, although it recognized the amount per hour claimed was less than often charged by 
attorneys. Additionally, there were some unnecessary motions and pleadings filed by the 
defendant and some work for research of the law and superfluous reviews of documents which 
should not be counted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that costs are hereby awarded in favor 
of Allstate Insurance Company as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of the court dated 
10/3/97. Additional costs are claimed in the Amended Memorandum of Costs filed with the 
court on 12/19/97, and Plaintiff may have 10 days from the date of receipt of this Order to 
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object or such additional costs set forth therein will be granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all Motions, Objections and issues 
not previously ruled on, or that have heretofore been reserved, are ruled on by these Findings, 
Conclusions and Order. 
DATED this ^ g ^ d a y of January, 1997. 
ROGER S.'DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and 
Order (as to liability), Attorney Fee's, and Costs by first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the 
following parties this day of January, 1997: 
DANIEL L. WILSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290 25th Street 
Suite 204 
Ogden, UT 84401 
JAN P. MALMBERG 
Attorney for Defendant 
29 West 100 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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